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Images From Abroad: Making Direct
Broadcasting by Satellites Safe
for Sovereignty
by JOEL R. PAUL
Assistant Professor, Washington College of Law, American University.
I. THE PROBLEM
"The advent of communications satellites will mean the end of pres-
ent barriers to the free flow of information; no dictatorship can build a
wall high enough to stop its citizens [from] listening to the voices from
the stars."
- Arthur C. Clarke1
"Our peoples are constantly subjected to the uncontrolled invasion
of news that inculcates in our masses alien values which threaten our
national identity."
- Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela2
Space, time and culture are essential to our idea of nationhood. Our
distance from other countries, our capacity to absorb news from remote
points over time, and our peculiar history and culture determine our ex-
perience as nationals of a modem country. To the extent that we define a
country as a culturally distinctive, relatively homogeneous political en-
tity, it has a sovereign right to control transnational communication.
This is the essence of a statist concept of culture, a concept that may be
threatened by direct television broadcasts by satellites.
Traditionally, countries have regulated the flow of information
across borders by censoring publications, restricting access to airwaves,
* The author acknowledges the diligent research assistance of Robert Krask and
Francis Smart, the guidance of librarians Gary McCann at American University, Patricia
Tobin at Georgetown University and Robert Schaaf at the Library of Congress, and the
editorial assistance of Thomas Marcussen. The author is also grateful to Professors Peter Jaszi
and James Boyle of American University for their comments on the manuscript and to his
former colleagues at Graham & James for their generous support, in particular, Ralph Pais
and Henry Zheng, for their ideas and encouragement.
1. As quoted in Dalfen, Direct Satellite Broadcasting: Towards International Arrange-
ments to Transcend and Marshal the Political Realities, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 289, 366 (1970).
2. As quoted in W. READ, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS 7 (1978).
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and regulating domestic print and broadcast media. As the media have
made remote events more immediate and accelerated the flow of news,
information, and culture across national frontiers, governments have
struggled to exclude alien ideas and values. Despite these attempts, soon
a direct broadcast satellite (DBS) over the Pacific Ocean could beam a
program from the West Coast to a home television set in Indonesia.3
Unlike prior generations of satellites, which bounced electromagnetic
waves between ground stations, the DBS acts as a powerful and self-con-
tained broadcasting station.4 Not only is there a significant saving, but
also the DBS has the capacity to reach home television audiences without
the cooperation of ground stations subject to the control of the receiving
country.5
Fears that the DBS will be abused to export Western culture, ideol-
ogy, and commercialism, and that less developed countries (LDCs) will
not have access to the technology or prime orbital locations, have pro-
duced demands for international regulation. 6 These fears, though not
wholly unfounded, exaggerate the potential of DBS. In fact, DBS will
operate under economic constraints which will limit their scope and
function for some time. 7
3. Direct broadcast satellites transmit or retransmit signals intended for direct reception
by the general public. See Decisions of the World Administrative Radio Conference (WAR C)for
Space Telecommunications, International Telecommunications Union (1971) § 84AP. Direct
reception includes both individual and community reception. Individual reception refers to
the reception of DBS transmissions by simple domestic installations with small dish-shaped
antennae. Community reception refers to reception by equipment which is more complex, has
larger antennae, and is intended for use by a group of people at one location or through a
distribution system covering a limited area.
4. K. QUEENEY, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES AND THE UNITED NATIONS 5-70
(1978).
5. Id. at 7-11.
6. For a general discussion of the concerns for international regulation, see S. MAC-
BRIDE, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD (1980).
7. Cost estimates of constrncting and launching a direct broadcast system vary according
to the scope of the system. COMSAT first proposed a national DBS system in the United
States which would cost $1 billion dollars by the end of the 1980's. Plan for TV by Satellite
Falls Apart, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1984, at Dl, col. 1. The European Space Agency's L-SAT,
which will provide two broadcast channels, will cost about $230 million. France and Germany
have planned to launch two DBS at about $286 million total cost. ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1981,
at 83, col. 1. The British Broadcast Company (BBC) has estimated that the initial investment
in BRITSAT, a British DBS program, will run over $300 million. ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1982,
at 50, col. 1. Radio Tele-Luxembourg is expected to spend $430 million for its two-channel
French/German DBS program. ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1981, at 84, col. 2. Seven United States
companies, which applied for FCC approval for direct broadcasting services in 1982, estimated
their costs as ranging from $136 million to $969 million for the initial stage. In re Applications
of CBS, Inc., 92 F.C.C.2d 64, 105-08 (1982); In re Application of Satellite Television Corp., 91
F.C.C.2d 953, 957 (1982).
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This Article will consider the short and long term prospects for DBS
domestic and international programs, and the institutional framework
within which the debate on regulation takes place. It will then examine
the paradigmatic arguments for and against the regulation of DBS re-
ferred to here as the "statist critique" and "free-flow critique," and four
strategies of international broadcast regulation: technical restrictions on
satellite operations, guidelines on broadcast content, a requirement of ob-
taining the prior consent of the receiving country, and procedural rules
for establishing and operating DBS systems. Finally, the Article consid-
ers the problems of assuring equal access to DBS systems by regulating
the allocation of orbital space and the radio spectrum, and suggests how
the resolution of problems with regulating broadcast programs and as-
suring equal access are interdependent.
A. Outlook for DBS
At present, relatively modest DBS programs have been initiated in
the United States, Luxembourg, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, In-
dia, the West Indies, Peru, Canada, and the Middle East.' Of the less
than one dozen DBS satellites that were expected to be in operation by
the end of this century,9 several have been delayed by economic and
political obstacles. In the United States, for example, the federal govern-
ment is not funding the development of DBS, leaving the financial risks
to private industry. The major networks have considerable investments
at stake, and the new cable networks are racing to reach a large segment
of the viewing public before a domestic DBS program becomes competi-
tive.10 The competition in the video market has intensified recently as a
result of increased demand for video cassette recorders (VCRs). Because
of competition from the VCR and cable markets, the prospects for direct
broadcasting in the United States do not look good.
In 1981, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) accepted
a plan allowing Satellite Television Corporation (a subsidiary of COM-
SAT) to begin DBS service as early as 1985.11 A number of broadcasting
companies became interested in DBS, and at one point eight applications
8. SATELLITE NEWS, THE 1983 SATELLITE DIRECTORY, at ii (5th ed. 1983); Wiessner,
The Public Order of the Geostationary Orbit: Blueprints for the Future, 9 YALE J. WORLD
PUB. ORD. 217, 221 (1983).
9. A. CHAYES, J. FAWCETT, M. ITO, & A. KISS, SATELLITE BROADCASTING 9-10
(1973) [hereinafter A. CHAYES].
10. See Television: The Dish vs. Cable, NEWSWEEK, June 6, 1983, at 38.
11. The FCC regulation scheme for DBS is discussed in Ferris, Direct Broadcast Satellites:
A Piece of the Video Puzzle, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 169 (1981); see also Hammer & Lyons,
Deregulation Options For a Direct Broadcast Satellite System, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 185 (1981).
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for DBS were pending before the FCC. 2 The FCC has approved appli-
cations from eight companies, including the United States Satellite
Broadcasting Company, Inc., Direct Broadcasting Satellite Corporation,
Satellite Television Corporation, National Christian Network, Advanced
Communications Corporation, Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc.,
Tempo Enterprises, Inc., and Advanced Communications Corporation.13
At present, United Satellite, which began DBS broadcasting in 1983, is
the only DBS service in the United States. It provides DBS service to
less than 10,000 homes and is financially distressed."' COMSAT and all
other major broadcast companies that had applied for DBS service have
now withdrawn their applications, concluding that DBS is not yet
economical. 15
Moreover, economic obstacles in the United States and high start-up
costs in the receiving countries prevent DBS from posing an immediate
threat to the LDCs. First, present receiving equipment cannot receive
DBS transmissions. To solve this problem, some DBS broadcasters have
proposed broadcasting at frequencies higher than standard television sets
can receive and augmenting televisions with dish-shaped elliptical anten-
nae. Modification of existing equipment, however, would be costly and
could lead to construction and zoning problems.' 6 Second, to prevent
12. By 1985, of the eight initial DBS licensees only four remained with another seven
applicants hoping to receive construction permits. For a general discussion of recent develop-
ments in the industry, see SATELLITE NEWS, THE 1985 SATELLITE DIRECTORY (1985).
13. In re applications of Satellite Syndications, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 1369, 1387-88 (1984); In
re applications of CBS, Inc., 99 F.C.C.2d 565, 576-77 (1984); In re applications of Tempo
Enterprises, Inc., No. 86-408 (FCC Sept. 26, 1986).
14. Satellite TV Systems Seen In Doubt, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1984, at D1, D5, col. 3.
15. Sanger, Satellite TVSystems in Doubt, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1984, at D5, col. 1; Plan
for TV by Satellite Falls Apart Over Risks, N.Y. Times, December 1, 1984, at D1, col. 1.
Although approximately 600,000 homes in rural America are equipped with dish-shaped an-
tennae, these antennae are being used to pirate television signals sent by satellites intended for
transmission to cable broadcasters and subscribers.
Many economists and broadcasters believe that the largest market for DBS service will be
in rural areas which currently have poor reception and do not have access to cable programs.
In well-populated areas, however, where cables are already laid, direct broadcasters may not
be able to offer subscribers sufficient savings or a wide enough range of programs to compete
with cable operators. Thus, despite market research, which estimates that anywhere from 3 to
20 million United States households will purchase DBS equipment, the future of direct broad-
casting is likely to be more modest than envisioned. See supra note 14.
16. If broadcasters were to use high-definition television broadcasting, as some United
States broadcasters initially proposed, the required cost of purchasing new television receivers
would be much greater. Highly sophisticated television receivers used for the experimental
Canadian DBS project cost from $5000 to $6000, while the equipment used in the Japanese
project cost between $1000 and $3000 per set. Frutkin, Direct Broadcast Programs Using
Space Satellites, 3 J. SPACE L. 17, 21-22 (1975). The BBC anticipates that the cost of re-
equipping home televisions for BRITSAT would be around $500 per set. ECONOMIST, Jan. 30,
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non-subscribing viewers from receiving broadcasts, DBS signals may
have to be encoded. Viewers would then be expected to purchase decod-
ing equipment which could be sophisticated and expensive. Third, coun-
tries could limit the construction and import of receiving equipment.
Consequently, it is unlikely that DBS television will be available for
home viewing in most LDCs in the immediate future.
In addition to economic constraints on the deployment of DBS tech-
nology, there will also be linguistic, geographic, and political barriers.
Language barriers help to mitigate the problem of unintentional broad-
casts because DBS broadcasts that are not in the language of the receiv-
ing country probably will not draw large audiences. There are also the
geographic barriers. Although a single DBS satellite may be capable of
reaching almost one-third of the earth's surface, the satellite will be fixed
in orbit relative to a point on earth and its broadcasting range will be
limited accordingly. Because the position of the DBS is fixed in orbit
relative to a point on earth, a broadcaster cannot transmit programs from
one hemisphere to another without launching another satellite.' 7 All the
affected countries, therefore, will have prior notice of broadcasting plans
and an opportunity to protest to the broadcaster's government. Finally,
DBS international programs will be constrained by political considera-
tions. In many LDCs the primary function of DBS will be to broadcast
to community television centers 18 where local groups will view govern-
ment sponsored educational and cultural programs. In these countries,
governments will retain the power to "pull the plug" on any objectiona-
ble foreign broadcast program.
Even in those countries where DBS is available for home consump-
tion, commercial or government broadcasters are unlikely to beam pro-
grams to other countries over the objections of the national governments
except in extraordinary circumstances. Commercial broadcasters would
not want to risk having their products removed from the market of the
receiving country in retaliation for unwanted advertisements. Foreign
governments generally have little to gain from interfering in domestic
politics19 and could be subject to diplomatic sanctions or reciprocal inter-
ference.20 Furthermore, because DBS signals can be received only by
1982, at 31, col. 1. In the United States, however, the present cost of an antenna alone is
between $400 to $800. Satellite TVSystems in Doubt, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1984, at D5, col. 1.
17. For a discussion of geostationary satellites, see Wiessner, supra note 8, at 218-25.
18. Most experts agree that DBS will be used in the LDCs for community educational
television. See A. CHAYES, supra note 9, at 22.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Arguably, broadcasts by foreign governments violate the principles of sovereign equal-
ity and non-interference in domestic affairs. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2; Declaration on Princi-
19861
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costly, obtrusive equipment that authorities can readily ban or control,
foreign countries that want to propagandize may prefer to use other
methods. For example, radio transmissions are cheaper, more accessible
in closed societies, and less likely to incur diplomatic sanctions.2" Audio
and visual cassette recordings can be smuggled easily into target coun-
tries, reproduced, disseminated, and stored. Finally, broadcasts could
be hampered by a variety of technical methods, including jamming or
destruction of foreign satellites or communications facilities by the re-
ceiving country.22
Nonetheless, even the most optimistic observer must admit that dis-
putes among countries over content and access to frequencies are likely
to arise. For example, disputes may arise over "spillover," which occurs
when a broadcast by the sending country unintentionally interferes with
reception in another receiving country. A dispute is particularly likely
when the broadcast offends the receiving country's laws concerning ob-
scenity, libel, advertising, national security, ideology, culture, or other
similar matters.
B. Overview of the Institutional Framework
The institutional framework illustrates the complexity of the debate
and the range of positions among developed countries and LDCs. The
debate has occurred within several key forums, particularly the General
Assembly, the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS),
the International Telecommunications Union (I.T.U.), and the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
pies of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the U.N., G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
21. Radio propaganda is widely employed by many governments, especially the United
States. The United States believes that radio broadcasting is the most effective means of pierc-
ing the "iron curtain" in part because radios are so popular in the eastern bloc countries. For
example, according to one United States government study, half of all households in the Soviet
Union own short-wave receivers. Whelan, Radio Liberty--A Study of Its Origins, Structure,
Policy, Programming and Effectiveness, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, March 22,
1972, at 120, reprinted in CONG. REC. S3380. For a discussion of U.S. radio propaganda
programs, see generally id.
22. Frutkin, supra note 16, at 23. It is unclear whether jamming foreign broadcasts vio-
lates international law. There is no specific prohibition against jamming, and it is widely prac-
ticed by several countries. Art. 35 of the International Telecommunications Convention,
however, prohibits "harmful interference." International Telecommunications Convention,
1982, Final Protocol, Additional Protocols, Optional Additional Protocol, Resolutions, Rec-
ommendations and Opinions, art. 35 [hereinafter I.T.C.].
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1. The General Assembly
Under Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter, the General As-
sembly has broad powers to discuss "any question relating to the mainte-
nance of international peace and security"23  and to make
recommendations "promoting international cooperation" in a range of
activities including politics, culture, and education so as to encourage the
development of international law.24 In practice, this has allowed the
General Assembly to consider virtually any issue of international interest
subject only to the limitations of article 2(7), which forbids the United
Nations Organization from intervening in "matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."2
The General Assembly's most important contributions to interna-
tional law in this area have been the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty),26 the Agree-
ment Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Moon Treaty),27 and a resolution on Principles Governing the
Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Televi-
sion Broadcasting (Resolution on Principles Governing DBS).28
The issue of international news and information flow has been raised
in the General Assembly and debated frequently. The Group of 77, com-
posed mostly of the General Assembly LDC members, has called for a
New World Information Order (NWIO), closely associated with the con-
cept of a New International Economic Order,29 to redirect the flow of
news and information between the rich and poor countries. While the
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 11(2).
24. Id. art. 13(1).
25. Id. art. 2, para. 7. Although the General Assembly's recommendations are non-bind-
ing, some international jurists contend that resolutions approved by a nearly unanimous vote
and reaffirmed over time may be considered evidence of "a general practice accepted as law."
The Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), provides that the sources of
international law to be applied by the International Court in resolving disputes shall include
"international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law." See R. HIGGINS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UN 4-
10 (1963). Presumably, the resolutions of the COPUOS and UNESCO could also be consid-
ered evidence of general practices accepted as law. The resolutions of these bodies, however,
are probably less representative of international norms because these organizations have more
limited membership and narrower purposes.
26. Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
27. G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/664 (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1534
(1979).
28. G.A. Res. 37/92, U.N. Doc. A/37/646 (1982).
29. For a review of the key documents outlining the New International Economic Order,
see Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 328 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281
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NWIO has meant different things at different times depending upon the
forum and the participants, it is generally associated with three broad
principles.30 First, the developed countries should provide the resources
for LDCs to improve their national news media's infrastructure so that
the LDCs are able to compete with news media from the developed coun-
tries. Second, the activities of foreign journalists should be subject to an
international code of professional responsibility. Third, international
news and information should be subject to some form of censorship to
protect countries from defamatory statements that interfere with domes-
tic or foreign policy and from reporting that is culturally or ideologically
biased.
The NWIO has received a mixed reception in the General Assem-
bly. Not all LDCs endorse these principles wholeheartedly. Clearly, the
need for foreign aid to develop a national news media infrastructure var-
ies greatly among the LDCs; the countries that have less of a need for
such aid attach a lower priority to the NWIO. The Soviet bloc favors the
most stringent censorship proposals despite its own propaganda net-
work.3 Some Western countries support elements of the NWIO. 32
Many Western governments have hesitated to support the NWIO for
economic and ideological reasons. Some of these countries, especially the
United States and the United Kingdom, have significant investments in
international news services and broadcasting networks which have vir-
tual monopolies in many LDCs.3 3 During the Carter Administration,
the United States pledged to give substantial assistance to the formation
of an International Program for the Development of Communication
(IPDC) to benefit news services in LDCs, but the Reagan Administration
(1974); Declaration of Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Eco-
nomic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 3202 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201, 3202 (1974).
30. For a review of the basic principles of the New World Information Order, see gener-
ally Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to
Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and
to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War, UNESCO Doc. 20c/20 Rev.
(1978) [hereinafter UNESCO Mass Media Declaration].
31. See generally Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
Direct Television Broadcasting, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/WG.3(V) CRP.I and Core I (1974)
[hereinafter 1974 Soviet Draft Convention].
32. The Canadians and Swedes, for example, have expressed support for the LDCs' per-
ceived need to protect national culture and politics from foreign news and information. The
Canadian and Swedish support for these concerns is exemplified by the joint Canadian-Swed-
ish Draft Proposal on DBS, discussed infra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
33. S. MACBRIDE, supra note 6, at 57-59; H. SMITH, THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMA-
TION 82-89 (1980); see generally infra note 80.
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has been less supportive.34 The Dutch and Norwegian governments have
made sizeable commitments to benefit the IPDC, but few other European
countries have expressed serious interest.35
2. The COPUOS
The COPUOS has been a standing committee of the General As-
sembly since 1959.36 There are forty-seven member countries repre-
sented on COPUOS, including the "space powers" (Canada, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, the
United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union.) Each of
these space powers has ratified the Outer Space Treaty, and each, as a
member of the I.T.U., is also bound by the I.T.U.'s radio regulations. 37
The COPUOS agenda includes a broad range of issues relating to techni-
cal and security interests. Since 1969, DBS has been a subject of continu-
ing concern within the COPUOS. In that year, COPUOS formed an Ad
Hoe Working Group on DBS (the "Working Group"). The Working
Group developed the draft Resolution on Principles Governing DBS,
which was subsequently approved by the General Assembly.38
3. The I.T.U.
The I.T.U., founded in 1865 and reorganized under the Atlantic
City Convention of 1947, operates as a specialized agency of the UN
based on a 1948 agreement.39 The I.T.U. is governed by the 1982 Inter-
national Telecommunications Convention (I.T.C.) which replaced the
prior 1973 Convention.' The I.T.U. promulgates regulations for all in-
ternational telecommunications services. An organ of the I.T.U., the In-
ternational Frequency Registration Board (IFRB), is responsible for
allocating and recording radio and telecommunications satellites. The
I.T.U. is headquartered in Geneva, and its members include all the mem-
ber countries of the UN, several nongovernmental organizations, and
34. The Reagan Administration has opposed increases in the budgets of the specialized
international agencies, including UNESCO. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1983, at 117, col. 2.
35. ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 1982, at 19, col. 1.
36. G.A. Res. 1472, 14 U.N. GAOR (856th plen. mtg.), at 5 (1959).
37. I.T.C., supra note 22; Moon Treaty, supra note 26.
38. G.A. Res., supra note 28.
39. The relationship between the UN and the I.T.U. is defined by the 1948 Agreement
contained in Annex 3 of the I.T.C. See I.T.C. supra note 22, art. 39.
40. I.T.C., supra note 22, replacing International Telecommunications Convention, Mal-
aga-Torremolinos, 1973, which entered into force April 7, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. No.
8572.
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several countries not belonging to the UN.4
The I.T.U. holds regular World Administrative Radio Conferences
(WARCs), which involve virtually all members and focus on specific is-
sues, such as the issue of satellites.4' In 1971, a special WARC on space
communications was held in Geneva. This WARC allocated frequency
bands for certain satellite services, including direct broadcasting. It also
established the principle of equal rights for all users of satellite frequen-
cies, rejecting the claims of prior users that they should be able to con-
tinue using frequencies without regard for the rights of others.4 3 In 1977,
another WARC met in Geneva specifically to discuss DBS. The 1977
WARC agreed on a plan for allocating orbital and frequency space
among European, Asian, and African countries." At another regional
conference in 1983, the member countries of North and South America
agreed to allocate orbital and frequency space.45 Finally, an interna-
tional WARC meeting in Geneva in 1985 discussed a proposal for
planned allocation of geostationary satellite service frequencies and
orbits,46 but failed to reach agreement and will reconvene in 1988. 4'
The I.T.U. has provided a useful forum for resolving disputes and
developing guidelines for more efficient use of the radio spectrum. At
41. Id.
42. In addition to the WARCs, Plenipotentiary Conferences are held every five years to
discuss the functions of the organization and to amend the Convention.
43. Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunica-
tions, I.T.U., Radio Regulations No. Spa2-428A (1971) [hereinafter 1971 WARC Radio Regu-
lations], reprinted in 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. No. 7435; see generally Butler, World
Administrative Radio Conference, 5 J. SPACE L. 93 (1977); DuCharme, Irwin & Zeitoun, Direct
Broadcasting by Satellite - The Development of the International Technical and Administra-
tive Regulatory Regime, 9 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 267, 269-72 (1984).
44. Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of the
Broadcasting-Satellite Service in Frequency Bands 11.7-12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) and
1L 7-12.5 GHz (in Region 1), I.T.U. (1977) [hereinafter 1977 WARC Radio Regulations]; see
generally DuCharme, supra note 43, at 272-75.
45. 1977 WARC Radio Regulations, supra note 44; see Butler, World Administrative Ra-
dio Conference, 5 J. SPACE L. 93-99 (1977).
46. See generally Noll, Work Accomplished by the First Session of the WARC on the Use of
Geostationary-Satellite and the Planning of the Space Services Utilizing It, 13 J. SPACE L. 174
(1985). The term "geostationary" is discussed infra note 96.
47. The Way It Was and Wasn't at WARC '85, BROADCASTING, Nov. 4, 1985, at 70. The
1985 WARC failed to come to terms with the issue of "a priori planning." The LDCs gener-
ally support "a priori planning" of geostationary satellite services frequencies and orbital posi-
tions. This means that each country would be assigned certain frequencies and orbital
positions without regard to the country's current needs. The United States opposes "a priori
planning" as wasteful. Instead, the United States favors assignment on a first-come, first-
served basis and has proposed reserving certain frequency bands (referred to as "expansion
bands") for the exclusive use of LDCs for a period of 15 years. Will There Be Room on the
Arc?, SCIENCE, Mar. 9, 1984, at 1043-45 [hereinafter SCIENCE].
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various times, the I.T.U. has attempted to reallocate frequencies to attain
an efficient and fair use of the spectrum. The concept of a "planned spec-
trum" has not been realized primarily because the developed countries
have appropriated the most valuable portions of the spectrum for their
own uses.48 While the I.T.U. does not recognize any "prior rights" for
preexisting radio users, it has no power to compel prior users to abandon
their frequencies.4 9 Most likely, any future international agreement to
allocate DBS frequency or orbital space will originate in the I.T.U.,
which will be in charge of monitoring DBS use and settling disputes. It
remains to be seen what enforcement mechanism, if any, the I.T.U. can
develop to ensure the effectiveness of an allocation scheme.
4. UNESCO
Finally, UNESCO has provided a forum for discussions concerning
the NWIO. The UNESCO Meeting of Experts in 1969 first discussed the
desirability of a "balanced" flow of news between the rich and poor coun-
tries.5 0 This theme was reaffirmed at the Sixteenth UNESCO General
Conference the following year. The Conference authorized UNESCO to
help member countries formulate "communications policies.""1 At the
Seventeenth UNESCO General Conference in Paris in 1972, the Soviet
Union proposed a "Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Sat-
ellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Edu-
cation and Cultural Exchange" (UNESCO Declaration on the Use of
Satellite Broadcasting).5 2 Article IX of the Soviet draft stated that
broadcasting would be permitted only with the prior consent of affected
countries. Over the objections of the United States and other Western
countries, the Conference approved an amended version of the Soviet
draft. 3 Another draft resolution on "Fundamental Principles Concern-
ing the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and In-
ternational Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to
Countering Racism, Apartheid and Incitement to War" (UNESCO Mass
48. Wiessner, supra note 8, at 239. For a discussion of the I.T.U.'s attempts to plan the
spectrum, see D. LEIVE, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: THE REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM 40 (1970).
49. See Wiessner, supra note 8, at 228-30.
50. For a discussion of the UNESCO Meeting of Experts in 1969, see K. QUEENEY, supra
note 4, at 119-22.
51. Id.
52. Text of the Declaration is contained in Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Soviet Union to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972); see also U.N. Doc. A/
C.1/L. 605 (1972).
53. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/109; UNESCO Doc. 17 C/76 (1972).
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Media Declaration) was prepared and discussed at the next several
UNESCO Conferences and adopted by acclamation at the Twentieth
General Conference in Paris in 1978."4 The UNESCO Mass Media Dec-
laration rejected the principle of "free flow of information" and, instead,
endorsed the principle of "a free flow and wider and more balanced dis-
semination of information."55 The phrase "balanced flow of informa-
tion" meant more than a redistribution of media resources. As reflected
in its title, the Declaration intended to declare that the mass media has a
responsibility to strengthen peace and understanding, promote human
rights and counter racism, apartheid and incitement to war.56 To this
end, it called for prohibitions on certain objectionable news content5
The Mass Media Declaration has become the basic document setting out
the terms of the NWIO.
In 1977, UNESCO Director General M'Bow appointed Sean Mac-
Bride, a Nobel Prize-winning diplomat, to head an International Com-
mission for the Study of Communications Problems (MacBride
Commission). The MacBride Commission report to the Twenty-First
UNESCO General Conference in Belgrade in 19808 assuaged the worst
fears of the West, but tensions within UNESCO remained high. In De-
cember of 1984, the United States officially withdrew from UNESCO.59
Withdrawal was partially motivated by continuing pressure for the estab-
lishment of an NWIO and for controls on foreign journalists reporting
from the Third World.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF DIRECT BROADCAST
SATELLITES
One approach to the contemporary debate over whether and how to
regulate DBS is to set the debate in its most extreme form." The argu-
54. UNESCO Mass Media Declaration, supra note 30.
55. Id. arts. IX, X(2).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. UNESCO Doe. 21 C/PRG.IV/DR. 8, at 5 C (1980). For a more complete presenta-
tion of the MacBride Commission's findings and recommendations, see S. MACBRIDE, supra
note 6.
59. For the text of the Secretary of State's message to the Secretary-Generals of UNESCO
and the UN announcing the United States' decision to withdraw from UNESCO, see Dep't St.
Bull., 41, 42 (Feb. 1984).
60. For the sake of clarity and brevity, the two models of argument that follow are set in
the extreme. Proponents of each model reflect a range of more moderate positions. The names
and characterizations of these models are those of the author, who, for two reasons, prefers
this approach to a point-by-point analysis of each government's position. First, the stated
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ment for regulation is based on the concern that DBS technology will
give the most advanced countries the key to cultural hegemony; the
counter-argument is concerned with the effects of any limitation on the
free flow of information. The former argument will be characterized as
the "statist critique" of broadcasting; the latter argument will be charac-
terized as the "free flow critique." In choosing these terms, the author
does not mean to attach any normative judgments, since he concludes
that both arguments, in the extreme, are flawed for the reasons that
follow.6 1
A. The Statist Critique
The argument for regulation builds on what may be called "statist"
assumptions of power and culture. Under these statist assumptions the
state cannot be defined apart from the culture and values of a relatively
homogenous national group. Any cultural influence that affects these ex-
pectations or values fundamentally alters the state. To preserve the state
in its present form, it is necessary to erect barriers to external ideas and
values. In addition, the statists advance the following propositions: the
physical facilities available to Western broadcasters already dwarf indige-
nous facilities in most LDCs; television has a particularly strong influ-
ence on national life; and Western television broadcasts, especially DBS
broadcasts, must be controlled to restrict Western political and economic
influence in LDCs through "cultural imperialism."62
positions of the interested governments are often ambiguous and subject to change depending
upon the composition of the government and the forum which it is addressing. For example,
both the United States and the Soviet Union have said that they recognize the importance of
encouraging a "free and balanced" flow of international telecommunications; however, de-
pending upon the particular issue and forum, their representatives have construed this princi-
ple in widely divergent manners. Second, even if an exhaustive review of the stated positions of
all interested governments could be accurately and completely presented, it would still be nec-
essary to go beneath the surface rhetoric to examine the underlying assumptions of each party.
By setting out idealized models of argument, the author invites consideration of the values and
assumptions of each argument which, hopefully, open the debate to a deeper level of criticism.
For a review of the stated positions of a good sample of interested governments, see gener-
ally U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/PV 131-50
(1975). See also Comment, Politics Among the Airwaves: An Analysis of Soviet and Western
Perspectives on International Broadcasting and the Right to Exchange Ideas and Information
Regardless of Frontiers, 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 237, 270 (1985); D. Webster, Direct Broadcast
Satellites: Proximity, Sovereignty and National Identity, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 1161, 1169 (1984).
See also, e.g., COPUOS Legal Subcommittee at 6-13, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/SR.208-225
(1974).
61. For a good general discussion of these issues see S. MACBRIDE, supra note 6.
62. For leading examples of this point of view, see generally A. WELLS, PICTURE TUBE
IMPERIALISM (1972); A. SMITH, THE GEOPOLITICS OF INFORMATION (1980); H. SCHILLER,
COMMUNICATION AND CULTURAL DOMINATION (1976).
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Proponents of the statist critique believe that television is more de-
structive of indigenous cultures than other medias or forms of intercul-
tural exchange.63 To support this belief, they advance three arguments,
which may be challenged on both descriptive and normative grounds.
First, the statists argue that in LDCs, television's impact on the
masses is not balanced by the print media's impact because of widespread
illiteracy. According to this logic, television has a greater influence in
LDCs than in developed countries and raises the spectre of "mind con-
trol" by foreign broadcasters." These objections to foreign television
overlook the fact that television rarely reaches the rural poor in LDCs
and that radio audiences in the LDCs are far larger.65 In fact, the range
of radio programming, which touches every segment of a developing so-
ciety, may counteract the influence of television and decrease the illiter-
ate poor's dependence on television for news and information.66
Second, the statists argue that the television medium itself over-
whelms and pacifies the individual, weakening his or her will to resist its
hidden messages.67 These descriptions of the impact of television are
popular but lack empirical support. Arguably, the effect of television
may be greater in developed countries where it is widely available and
often the primary news source for the majority of the population. In the
LDCs, on the other hand, fewer persons can afford television. Thus, the
television watcher tends to be more literate and affluent than the average
person. Those who comprise the television audiences in LDCs, there-
fore, probably receive news and information from a variety of sources,
including the print media. It may also be true that television cultivates a
critical and intellectual public, whereas radio and newspapers - the so-
called "hot" media - are more likely to incite mass action.68
Third, statists argue that Western television celebrates hidden cul-
tural values and experiences in ways that are detrimental to develop-
63. See, e.g., Gauhar, Free Flow of Information: Myths and Shibboleths, I THIRD WORLD
Q. 3 (1979).
64. See generally A. WELLS, supra note 62.
65. S. MACBRIDE, supra note 6, at 61. In 1983 there were 60 million radio receivers in
Africa, 121 million in Latin America, and 300 million in Asia. At the same time, there were
10 million television receivers in Africa, 43 million in Latin America, and 132 million in Asia.
See Radio Broadcasting: Receivers, 1985 UNESCO YEARBOOK ON STATISTICS 12.
66. Alan Wells argues that the tradition of communal watching in Latin America means
that television does reach at least the urban poor. A. WELLS, supra note 62, at 91. Jeremy
Tunstall replies that Wells exaggerates the role of television, which remains inaccessible to the
rural poor, and overlooks the greater influence of radio in LDCs. J. TUNSTALL, THE MEDIA
ARE AMERICAN 60-61 (1977).
67. See, e.g., Gauhar, supra note 63, at 66-67.
68. See generally M. MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA (1964).
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ment.69 Perhaps this criticism of Western television is justified.
Entertainment programs that portray waste and extravagant consumer-
ism may encourage consumer expectations and demands for foreign im-
ports that are contrary to the development plans of the national
government. 70 The consequences are increased consumerism leading to
waste, reduced savings, and heightened economic dualism. 71 These criti-
cisms, however, do not refute the value of television or even of foreign
broadcasting per se. Rather, they suggest the need for a balanced pro-
gramming policy, stressing the importance of production and saving, as
well as economic policies to discourage dualism and reduce consumption
of foreign consumer items.
The statist critique of direct broadcasting also fails on normative
grounds. What do the statists mean when they describe a transfer of
culture as "imperialistic"? Can this view be distinguished from an isola-
tionist, ethnocentric attitude adverse to fostering international
cooperation?
In the classic analysis of cultural imperialism, 72 colonial culture is
portrayed as a tool for fostering dependence on the metropolis. Imperial-
ists transfer their culture to the colonies and persuade the local elites that
the indigenous civilization never existed. According to this classical de-
scription of cultural imperialism, the message to the local elites is that,
without colonial domination, the colony would collapse into a cultural
void. Thus, cultural imperialism tries to justify continued political domi-
nation to the local elite, while maintaining in the indigenous population a
sense that the pre-colonial culture is inferior.7 3
This analysis seems less compelling today. A strong Third World
movement has emerged which is independent of the developed countries.
Although arguably many LDCs remain dominated by Western economic
hegemony, political control has declined significantly. Today, the Third
World movement regularly asserts its political independence from the
developed countries in UN debates and resolutions. Foreign culture no
longer serves to justify political domination, and it is difficult to see how
foreign broadcasts justify economic hegemony in the same way that cul-
tural imperialism justified political hegemony under the classical analy-
69. See e.g., Gauhar, supra note 63 at 67-74; H. SCHILLER, supra note 62.
70. Alan Wells, in his study of the effects of United States television on Latin American
development, concluded that the essential problem was that United States television stressed
the value of consumption while developing countries need to teach their people the ethics of
production and savings. A. WELLS, supra note 62, at 118-25.
71. Id.
72. F. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 206-48 (1963).
73. Id.
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sis. The Third World movement has encouraged a renewed sense of
cultural identity and national pride. Foreign culture coexists with the
indigenous culture in LDCs, enriching rather than replacing the indige-
nous culture. Free people can choose their cultural forms; they can bor-
row from other cultures to breed new forms. They are victims neither of
colonial culture nor of historical accident, neither trapped in a colonial
present nor in an ancient past. Free nations thus evolve dynamic
cultures.74
Nevertheless, some have argued that a new form of cultural imperi-
alism has developed under which local elites are manipulated to facilitate
economic penetration of the LDCs. These proponents, however, fail to
explain precisely how foreign cultural influence encourages the national
leadership to favor Western investment and marketing.7 5 Others have
argued that an economic imperative to penetrate local cultures "arises
out of a market system and the way that system establishes its priorities
and consequently its rewards and sanctions."7 6 From this interpretation
of cultural imperialism, it follows that the way to eliminate domination is
to eliminate the market system. International regulation of DBS alone
will not reverse the economic imperative of capitalist society.77
The spectre of cultural imperialism has led to some opposition to
direct broadcasting. According to the Secretary of the Working Group
on DBS, Nandisiri Jasentuliyana, however, "the [LDCs'] fears of direct
broadcast satellites .. are somewhat unfounded. [This] is unfortunate
because their real interest should be how to use the technology. The fear
is the fear of the unknown and perhaps this is quite exaggerated."7 The
cultural hegemony critique opposes internationalism, rejecting the values
of pluralism and cultural exchange.
B. The Free Flow Critique
According to the free flow critique, barriers to the free flow of infor-
74. See Gauhar, supra note 63, at 68-74.
75. See generally A. SMITH, supra note 62. Smith is unclear, but he cautions against
insulating any state from foreign cultures. He writes that "there is a danger that a kind of
cultural world war could break out with a wave of ethnic protectionisms ... pure self-destruc-
tive chauvinism and autarky could follow in the wake of campaigns for the preservation of
national cultures." Id. at 64.
76. H. SCHILLER, supra note 62, at 7-8.
77. Id. at 68-97. Schiller explains the rise of international telecommunications in terms of
class conflict. He argues that higher productivity has increased our available leisure time and
that this contains the threat of economic and social instability in capitalist society. To main-
tain control over the labor force, it is necessary to develop the "instruments of persuasion" to
dull workers' sensibilities and to convey an image of social well-being and tranquility.
78. K. QUEENFY, supra note 4, at 48.
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mation between countries violate fundamental international human
rights.7 9 In the extreme, this argument assumes a free global market of
information and ideas. The free market analysis treats ideas like other
commodities: it presumes competitive forces operating in perfect mar-
kets with no barriers to entry. The optimum distribution of media facili-
ties is defined as one which maximizes the total output of information.
To the extent that the free market analysis focuses on distribution of
media facilities, it either assumes that LDCs have a fair share of these
facilities or could develop them without serious impediment. Thus, it
ignores the LDCs' inability to compete with Western news sources be-
cause of the LDCs' lack of sophisticated technological infrastructure.
This position is both empirically and normatively flawed.
It is empirically flawed in that it assumes a free flow of information
in all directions. In fact, the flow of information is a cascade of news
from the most developed countries to the least developed. The maldistri-
bution of mass media is the cause of this unidirectional flow of informa-
tion: the news broadcasting facilities are largely controlled by the
Western media, 0 and the West's dominance of television broadcasting is
furthered by its prominence in the print media and radio.
This global transfer of information is "free" only in the sense that
LDCs are "free" to listen to what developed countries broadcast.81 The
79. For a discussion of the free flow critique, see generally A. Chayes & L. Chazen, Policy
Problems in Direct Broadcasting from Satellites, 4 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 4 (1970); S. MAC-
BRIDE, supra note 6, at 37-38, 137-44.
80. Consider the extent of United States control of international broadcasting: Voice of
America broadcasts are heard 15,000 hours weekly in 38 languages and received in 97 coun-
tries; CBS, NBC, and ABC each broadcast to roughly 100 countries; ABC broadcasts alone
reach more than 60% of the world's televisions; foreign audiences of American television are
believed to outnumber American viewers by 20 to 1; and an average of 55% of all television
programs in 91 LDCs surveyed were imported from the West. H. SCHILLER, supra note 62, at
80-82; S. MACBRIDE, supra note 6, at 61, 124. The gross disparity in the distribution of broad-
cast technology led one LDC UN representative to complain that, while foreign heads of state
may soon be able to address his people, his own president could not. K. QUEENEY, supra note
4, at 48.
81. The present global information flows are marked by a serious inadequacy and
imbalance. The means of communicating information are concentrated in a few
countries. The great majority of countries are reduced to being passive recipients of
information which is disseminated from a few centres. In a situation where the
means of information are dominated and monopolised by a few, freedom of informa-
tion really comes to mean the freedom of these few to propagate information in the
manner of their choosing and the virtual denial to the rest of the right to inform and
be informed objectively and accurately.
Ministers of Information of the Non-Aligned Countries (Declaration, New Delhi, July, 1976),
reprinted in S. MACBRIDE, supra note 6, at 142 n. 1. The MacBride Commission concluded
that this imbalance reflects the political and economic dominance of the industrialized coun-
tries, but that its effects on the LDCs' social framework result in a "qualitative imbalance" as
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same news which is chosen, written, and edited for an affluent household
in Mafin County, California, is transmitted to hundreds of countries
daily. The concerns of an LDC audience are largely irrelevant to a
United States television network which directs its news-gathering and re-
porting to the interests of its Western audience. LDC critics charge that
the Western press is laden with liberal values historically tied to imperial-
ism and that Western reporting of the LDCs is inaccurate, incomplete,
and biased.8 2 Western news reporting fosters a negative image of LDCs
in the West and in other LDCs that may adversely affect both internal
and external policies of those LDCs.s3 The free flow critique assumes an
open marketplace of ideas which bears little resemblance to the real
world. By defending the existing one-way flow of information and news
from a few of the most developed countries to the poorer LDCs, the free
flow critique ignores the right to media access that guarantees a diversity
of news sources.8 4
The second flaw in the free flow critique is that it derives from the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights85 and the United Nations Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights 6 an international right to receive, im-
part, and discuss information and ideas. The United Nations Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights only binds countries that have ratified it.
The Universal Declaration is a General Assembly resolution that is non-
binding, unless it can be considered a source of international law repre-
senting "international custom as evidence of general practice accepted as
law."8 7
well as a "quantitative imbalance" in the distribution of resources. S. MAcBRIDE, supra, note
6, at 148.
82. See, e.g., Gauhar, supra note 63, at 61-63.
83. A. SMITH, supra note 62, at 69-110; see also W. READ, supra note 2, at 7.
84. The difficulty of assuring popular access to media in the face of growing concentration
in the communications industry is widely recognized even among the developed countries. For
example, United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Burger acknowledged in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti that the media conglomerates may pose a serious threat to the
political process and that their continued growth places "in a few hands the power to inform
the American people and shape the future." 435 U.S. 765, 797 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring) (quoting Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 250 (1974)).
85. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948). Art. 19 provides
that "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers."
86. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 172, at 178. Art.
19(2) states that everyone shall have the right "to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art,
or through any other media of his choice."
87. See supra note 25.
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Even a cursory review of actual country practice, however, would
indicate that countries do not in fact recognize an asserted right to im-
part and receive information across national borders. For example, the
Soviet bloc countries do not permit the distribution of unlicensed West-
ern publications within their borders. The Soviet Union routinely jams
foreign broadcasts to the Soviet bloc and protests against any asserted
Western "right" to broadcast propaganda in violation of Soviet air-
space." Almost half of the LDCs maintain government control over all
print and broadcast media and censor foreign news and information to
the extent feasible; only a third of the LDCs permit media to operate
relatively freely within their borders and allow broadcasting of foreign
news and information without censorship. 9 The United States licenses
and regulates all radio and television broadcasting" and prohibits unli-
censed foreign broadcasts.9 ' The United Kingdom has been especially
protective of the BBC's domestic radio monopoly.9" These examples cast
serious doubt on the idea that there is a recognized international right to
broadcast information across national borders. Although the degree of
censorship varies from country to country, virtually no government per-
mits an unimpeded flow of foreign broadcasting.
Moreover, a regime of uncontrolled international communication
may not be possible or even desirable. Information is not a commodity
like any other; it is linked with values and perceptions. When a country
receives a foreign broadcast, it is exposed to aspects of foreign culture
and politics. It is difficult to imagine that a wholly unregulated regime
could be realized in a world of varying political systems. Nor would
human rights necessarily benefit if foreign broadcasters were permitted to
broadcast defamatory, obscene, or inflammatory material, otherwise for-
bidden by domestic law.
On the other hand, it is important to recognize that the NWIO does
88. Soviet jamming of Radio Liberty programs is discussed in Whelan, supra note 21, at
277-304. For a general discussion of the legality of jamming of Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty, see Schenone, Jamming the Stations: Is There an International Free Flow of Informa-
tion?, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 501-29 (1984).
89. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1981, at A35, col. 2.
90. Radio Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301.
91. Id.
92. In 1966 and 1967, the United Kingdom sought to restrict so-called "pirate ship"
broadcasts to the United Kingdom from international waters. The pirate broadcasts interfered
with continental radio stations and captured a sizeable portion of the British market with their
popular commercial programming. Special legislation was enacted by Parliament to prosecute
the pirate ship owners for unlicensed broadcasting. See U.K. Marine, L. C. Broadcasting (Of-
fences) Act, 1967. The Act was passed on July 14, 1967 and came into effect on August 15,
1967.
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not mean censorship. Many supporters of the NWIO oppose govern-
ment control of the media and are only demanding a more balanced flow
of information and greater respect for indigenous culture. 93 Many of
these supporters admit that LDCs have attempted to muzzle their own
media 94 and argue for greater press freedom in the LDCs as a necessary
condition to national development."
C. Observations
The assumptions and values underlying the statist and free flow
models are neither accurate descriptions of reality nor desirable objec-
tives for world order. The free flow model assumes a free market when
in fact the market is dominated by a few powerful players. It is hardly
surprising that the Western proponents of a free flow of information are
suspect in the eyes of the LDCs; the Western proponents' communica-
tions corporations dominate international markets and they do not rec-
ognize an international right to receive and impart information in their
home markets. Conversely, the statist model would not open the market
to allow a more balanced flow of information, but would perpetuate the
existing inequities and encourage nationalistic attitudes that would deter
cultural exchange and cooperation.
The underlying differences between the free flow and statist critiques
relate to the issue of access. In a world in which the LDCs have no real
capacity to compete with Western media conglomerates, Western claims
for communication freedom are disingenuous. At the same time, a
movement toward cultural autarky would not be constructive either.
The United States has offered LDCs access to DBS technology in ex-
93. For example, the Philippines and Argentina, which have supported some form of con-
tent regulation, have also argued that the Universal Declaration protects the free flow of infor-
mation broadcast by DBS. K. QUEENEY, supra note 4, at 68-70. See also A. SMITH, supra,
note 62, at 172.
94. Anthony Smith, for example, has chastised some LDCs for demanding too much con-
trol without providing adequate safeguards for intellectual freedom. A. SMITH, supra note 62,
at 175. Others have complained that within LDCs the flow of information is highly central-
ized and filtered through the government. The Indian delegate to the COPUOS, Mr. Yash
Pol, complained that "I do not believe that I would want all villages in India to get all their
programs from Delhi .... I believe that if DBS has to be used in my country for educational
development, then the developmental programs which relate to and touch people's lives inti-
mately just cannot all be produced in Delhi ...... He concluded that the goal of direct
broadcasting must be to integrate the LDCs, as well as the whole world. U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/PV.192, at 11 (1979).
95. See generally Gauhar, supra note 63. He concludes that the suppression of national
news agencies is primarily responsible for the continued domination of the Western media in
LDCs. People in the LDCs rely upon Western news for relatively objective reporting, which is
unavailable from domestic sources. Id. at 71-74.
[V/ol. 9
Direct Broadcasting by Satellite
change for a freer international regime, but the LDCs remain suspicious.
Considering the size and strength of the United States broadcast empire,
it is unlikely that it will tolerate serious competition from other
countries.
To ensure that LDCs have sufficient access to DBS technology,
LDCs must have adequate orbital space and frequencies, as well as tech-
nical assistance. Moreover, abuse of DBS communication for propa-
ganda purposes or in violation of domestic communication regulations
will ignite fires of cultural protectionism. An effective access regime,
therefore, must be concerned with content control as well as the alloca-
tion of technical resources.
III. STRATEGIES FOR REGULATING CONTENT OF
DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES
Having recognized that a balance between content control and in-
creased access to the media and information is necessary, the next ques-
tion is, how should direct broadcasting be regulated, by national or
international regulation? If international regulation were imposed, it
could take a number of forms, including technical restrictions on satellite
operation, content guidelines, prior consent requirements, or procedural
rules for establishing and maintaining DBS systems.
Three strategies for regulation will be considered: national regula-
tion, international substantive regulation, and international access regu-
lation. These strategies are not mutually exclusive. The purpose of this
discussion is to consider the legal and practical problems associated with
each strategy and to assess the impact of each regulation strategy on the
future of DBS.
A. National Regulation
A country that receives broadcasts from foreign territory via a DBS
positioned in the geostationary orbit (GSO)9 6 could establish jurisdiction
to regulate and restrict such broadcasts based on one of the jurisdictional
principles: territoriality, universality, or effects.9 7 Subjecting broadcast-
96. The geostationary or geosynchronous orbit (GSO) is an orbit 22,300 miles over the
earth's equator. At this height, an artificial satellite's period of rotation equals the earth's, so
that a satellite in the GSO appears to remain stationary relative to a point on earth. This
special characteristic permits continuous use of one satellite to cover an area, an effect similar
to a radio tower projected above the earth's surface. One DBS in the GSO is sufficient to
broadcast to one-third of the earth's surface simultaneously. Wiessner, supra note 8, at 218.
97. The principle of "territoriality" relates to the exercise of jurisdiction by a country over
all persons and property located within the territory of the country. "Universality" refers to
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ers to liability wherever their signals are received would expose broad-
casters to virtually limitless liability with chilling effects on freedom of
expression. What a broadcaster can advertise on United States television
may not be acceptable in other countries; what may be acceptable pro-
gramming in other countries may be offensive in the United States.
Moreover, ever-widening legal liability would defeat the jurisdictional
principles that aim to minimize conflicts between legal systems and maxi-
mize the efficient exchange of goods and services across borders.
An obvious problem raised by national regulation of DBS is how a
country can enforce its jurisdiction against a foreign broadcaster. Pre-
sumably, a foreign broadcaster could insulate itself from a country's reg-
ulation by withdrawing property or personnel from the jurisdiction. A
country might then request extradition of the offending broadcaster's re-
sources if an extradition treaty exists, or it could seek to enforce a judg-
ment of its own courts in the courts of the broadcaster's country. Such
measures, however, rely on the law of the broadcasting country and may
be ineffective. In the United States, for example, broadcasters are
shielded by the first amendment from intrusive regulations that have a
chilling effect on free speech. 98 Moreover, government-owned broadcast-
ing networks may claim that sovereign immunity shields them from the
jurisdiction of the courts of other countries.
Countries may take other steps against foreign DBS broadcasters to
enforce domestic regulations, including jamming broadcasts or neutraliz-
ing the DBS or other broadcasting facilities. The I.T.C. allows member
countries to stop "private telecommunications" that endanger the "se-
curity of the State or are contrary to their laws, to public order or to
decency."9 9 The I.T.C. further provides that a member may suspend
"international telecommunications service" for an indefinite time pro-
vided that it immediately notify the I.T.U.'s Secretary-General of such
the exercise of jurisdiction by a country over persons outside the territory of the country based
on alleged actions in violation of general principles of international law. It is generally applied
to a country's exercise of jurisdiction over persons who commit acts of piracy on the high seas
or persons who commit war crimes or crimes against humanity. The principle of "effects,"
also known as the "protective" principle, justifies the exercise of jurisdiction by a country over
persons outside the territory of the country when their actions have resulted in injury to per-
sons or property within the country's territory. Each of these jurisdictional bases raises legal
problems beyond the scope of this article. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 402 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). See also The
Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10.
98. See generally M. PRICE, FIRST AMENDMENT CONSTRAINTS AND THE DIRECT
BROADCASTING SATELLITE CONTROVERSY (1975).
99. I.T.C., supra note 22, art. 19(2).
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action."° This may be interpreted as requiring prior notification before
countries legally may jam foreign radio broadcasts within their territory.
The same principle arguably applies to jamming television broadcasts.
Finally, the I.T.C. provides that all stations must be established and op-
erated in such a manner as not to cause "harmful interference" to the
telecommunications of other members, and it requires members to ensure
broadcasters observe this restriction.101 This provision does not author-
ize retaliatory or preemptive action in response to "harmful interfer-
ence," nor does it indicate whether "harmful interference" includes
broadcasts that contain offensive material but do not actually prevent
other telecommunications transmissions.
In 1970, the Soviet Union proposed to the COPUOS Working
Group a draft convention of model principles governing the use of
DBS. 102 This Draft permitted retaliation by "any available means"
against direct broadcasts transmitted to another country without the
consent of its government.10 3 The 1974 Soviet Draft provided that if un-
authorized broadcasts contained certain offensive material, a receiving
country may take "measures which are recognized as legal under na-
tional law."'" Presumably, the Soviet Draft would permit a country
receiving illegal broadcasts to jam radio waves or destroy satellites if that
country's law permits such jamming. Insofar as it proposes no limitation
on the right to retaliate against illegal satellite broadcasting, the Soviet
Draft abandons the international legal principle of proportionality of re-
sponse 0 5 against imminent threats to a sovereign nation; it would legiti-
100. Id. art. 20.
101. Id. art. 35.
102. 1970 Soviet Draft Model Principles for the Use of Artificial Earth Satellites for Radio
and Television Broadcasting, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/WG.3/CRP.1 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 So-
viet Draft].
103. Id. art. VII.
104. Report of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites on the Work of its Fifth
Session, art. IX, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/127 (1974). The reference to "national law" was subse-
quently amended to refer to "international law."
105. If an assault against a foreign broadcast satellite is to be justified as a reprisal, the
extent and nature of the force used must be proportional to the wrong done. Naulilaa Case
(Portugal v. Germany), Special Arbitral Tribunal, Ann. Dig. 1927-1928, Case No. 360. "Re-
prisals, be they positive or negative, must be in proportion to the thing done, and to the
amount of compulsion necessary to get reparation." 2 H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, 115 (6th ed. 1944).
Even if an attack on a foreign satellite were justified as an act in self-defense against a
continuing or imminent wrong, it would still be subject to the rule of proportionality. The
attacker would have to show a need to act in the face of an immediate and overwhelming
threat to its security, leaving no opportunity to deliberate or choose alternative means. A.
HIGGINS & HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. 1924). See The Caroline Case (1808), 2 J.
MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906).
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mize unilateral state action against foreign property without
compensation.
National regulation of direct broadcasting cannot provide a firm
foundation for the future development of international telecommunica-
tions. Unrestrained unilateral barriers to communication, conflicting
regulations, limitless liability, and enforcement difficulties will increase
the expense of DBS, abuse the rights of journalists, and impede the flow
of information. Without an international regime, the only certain redress
receiving countries would have to objectionable broadcasts would be re-
taliation against satellite facilities. Such measures would undermine the
stability of the global order.
B. International Substantive Regulation
The jurisdictional and enforcement problems associated with na-
tional regulation suggest the need for an international regulatory frame-
work. Such a scheme should address both the substance of the broadcast
and the allocation of technical resources which determine who can
broadcast. Four strategies concerning the substance of the broadcast will
be considered: technical restrictions, content guidelines, prior consent re-
quirements, and procedural rules aimed at broadcasting arrangements
and dispute settlement.
1. Technical Restrictions
Technical restrictions are aimed at controlling the use of technology
through the I.T.U. 10 6 These restrictions are content neutral because they
apply regardless of the nature of the material broadcast. Technical re-
strictions allow the receiving country to determine permissible content.
In addition, the broadcasting country has the burden of developing tech-
nical means to prevent broadcasts from spilling over into countries that
have not consented to receive the broadcast signals.
Three sets of technical restrictions have been promulgated by the
I.T.U. The first deals with minimizing the problem of spillover in gen-
eral; 10 7 the second requires some degree of consent from foreign coun-
tries;10 8 and the third requires coordination of frequencies through
registration. 109
The 1971 World Administrative Radio Conference (the 1971
106. See supra note 43.
107. See 1971 WARC Radio Regulations, supra note 43.
108. Id. No. Spa2-428a.
109. Id. Nos. Spa2-639AA - 639DX.
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WARC) of the I.T.U. adopted certain radio regulations to address spil-
lover.' 10 These regulations specify that space stations must be capable of
(1) immediately ceasing broadcasts if other countries object, and (2)
holding their orbital positions and the direction of their antennae within
stipulated limits. These regulations reduce the risk that satellites might
accidentally broadcast across national boundaries.
The same conference adopted Radio Regulation No. Spa2-428A to
serve the dual purposes of minimizing spillover and requiring the prior
consent of receiving countries before broadcasting. The resolution pro-
vides that:
In devising the characteristics of a space station in the Broadcasting-
Satellite Service, all technical means available shall be used to reduce,
to the maximum extent practicable, the radiation over the territory of
other countries unless an agreement has been previously reached with
such countries.111
The regulation is targeted at the technical design of the DBS system
and requires modification of the satellite design to minimize spillover,
unless a prior agreement has been reached with affected countries. The
regulation is unclear, however, on which circumstances require prior
consent.1 12 If the regulation is read as an aspirational goal, then a prior
agreement will not be required so long as the broadcaster makes a good
faith effort to reduce radiation over other countries. Indeed, the regula-
tion does not explicitly prohibit broadcasting without such an agreement.
Thus, it may be argued that 428A, unlike other substantive proposals
now before COPUOS, does not require prior consent.' 1
3
For the purposes of this discussion, it is enough to know that pres-
ent I.T.U. regulations protect countries from interference with other
countries' broadcasting activities.1 4 As technology improves, the I.T.U.
should continue to require technical improvements in DBS plans, im-
110. Id. Nos. Spa2-428a, 470V, 470VB, and 470VF.
111. Id. No. Spa2-428A.
112. Id.
113. "The ITU Radio Regulations and related rules were adopted for effecting technical
coordination for the purposes of preventing interference with radio communication, whereas
proposed principles on direct television broadcast from satellite are aiming... at governing the
content of programmes transmitted by this technology." Statement of Japan, as quoted in K.
QUEENEY, supra note 4, at 152.
114. The 1971 WARC also adopted Radio Regulation No. Spa2-3, which requires the re-
gistration of broadcasting satellite frequencies and coordination with other space and terres-
trial station frequencies. The specifics of this procedure are not important in terms of their
effect on the content of direct broadcasting, though they are quite significant for ensuring the
efficient use of frequencies. For a more complete explanation of the 1971 WARC regulations,
refer to A. BERRADA, FREQUENCIES FOR BROADCASTING SATELLITES (1972).
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provements that would minimize, if not eliminate, the problem of
spillover.
2. Content Guidelines
There have been a number of proposals in COPOUS to develop gen-
eral guidelines describing the material that is inappropriate for direct
broadcasting."' This effort should not be viewed as a substitute for
other technical restrictions on DBS. Instead, it may be seen as supple-
menting any regime which minimizes technical spillover; it ensures that
whatever broadcasts do spill across national frontiers will conform to a
universal code. As of yet, no international consensus has emerged in
favor of any proposed guidelines.
The only binding international convention which prohibits satellites
from broadcasting certain materials is the Brussels Convention of
1974.16 The Convention protects the copyright of materials broadcast
by satellites other than DBS and prevents "poachers" from using DBS to
rebroadcast material intercepted from another satellite. For the purposes
of this discussion, the significance of the Brussels Convention lies in its
exemption of DBS. Apparently, the countries that attempted to use the
Convention as a vehicle for content control were unwilling to protect
Western copyrights of direct broadcasting materials without content re-
strictions.1 17 The Soviet bloc countries lobbied unsuccessfully at Brussels
for prohibitions on materials that are detrimental to international peace
or security, publicize ideas of war, nationalism or racial hatred, interfere
with domestic affairs of countries, or undermine national laws, customs,
and traditions.118 The defeat of these proposals suggests that there is no
international consensus on which materials should be prohibited from
direct broadcast. The United States has argued that, in the absence of
such consensus, broadcasters have the right to broadcast anything not
prohibited by domestic laws.119
115. See generally K. QUEENEY, supra note 4, at 58-60, 66-74, and 97-111.
116. Convention Relating to the Distribution of Program-Carrying Signals Transmitted by
Satellite, May 21, 1974, art. 3, U.N.T.S. 17949 (entered into force August 25, 1979).
117. Christol, The 1974 Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Program-Carry-
ing Signals Transmitted by Satellite: An Aspect of Human Rights, 6 J. SPACE L. 19, 30-31
(1978).
118. Id. at 31.
119. The United States delegate to COPUOS has argued that "we know of no international
law which declares that it is illegal to conduct international broadcasting via satellite .... It is
our understanding that one of the central questions under study by this Working Group is
whether or not any such prohibitions should be established." U.N. Doc. A.AC105/C.21/117
(1974).
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In the UN, efforts to draw up guidelines have been concentrated
within the COPUOS Working Group on DBS. The Working Group has
considered a variety of proposals for controlling the political, cultural,
and commercial content of broadcast programs. At the third session of
the Working Group in 1970, the Soviet Union proposed eight principles
for controlling content. 120 The Soviet proposal would prohibit "broad-
casts which are amoral or provocative in nature or which in any other
matter tend to interfere with the national life of States." 121 The Japanese
responded with a more specific set of principles, banning war propa-
ganda, incitement to perform subversive acts against political institutions
in the receiving country, slander against the national honor of the receiv-
ing country, and criticism of the international policies of the receiving
country that interfere with domestic affairs. 122 The Working Group did
not act upon either the Soviet or the Japanese proposals.
In 1972, the Soviets submitted a draft convention on principles gov-
erning the use of DBS (the 1972 Soviet Draft Convention) 23 to the Gen-
eral Assembly, bypassing the COPUOS. The Draft would prohibit the
broadcast of "material which is immoral or instigating in nature or is
otherwise aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs or foreign policy of
other states."' 24 Ambassador Malik of the Soviet Union defended this
proposal, declaring: "[we] decisively oppose the imposition of unilateral
information by one Power ... on all other countries... so as to achieve a
situation where all the countries of the world would think and live ac-
cording to the tenets prevailing in that one country."' 25
A caucus of seven Western countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Italy, Japan, Holland, and the United Kingdom) offered amendments
recognizing the importance of protecting "the free flow of communica-
tion on a basis of strict respect for the sovereign rights of states" and
assigning to COPUOS the task of drawing up principles to govern the use
of satellites. 26 These amendments were approved, and the General As-
sembly adopted the amended Soviet Draft Convention in the form of a
120. 1970 Soviet Draft, supra note 102.
121. Id. art. V.
122. Reports of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites: Comments Received
From Governments, Specialized Agencies and Other Competent International Bodies, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/79, at 7 (1970).
123. Draft International Convention proposed by the Soviet Union on Principles Governing
the Use by States ofArtificial Earth Satellies for Direct Television Broadcasting, U.N. Doc. A/
8771 (1972), reproduced in U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/117, Annex III.
124. Id. art. IV. Notably, news and information are omitted from the stated purposes; it is
unclear what the Soviets intended by this omission.
125. U.N. Doc. A/C.I/PV.1861, at 61 (1972).
126. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1870, at 32-45 (1972).
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resolution by a vote of 102 to 1. The United States opposed, and seven
countries abstained. 1
27
In 1974, the Soviet Union presented to the fifth session of the Work-
ing Group revised draft principles governing the use of DBS (the "1974
Soviet Draft Convention").128 This Draft was intended as a working
document toward the completion of an international agreement and
would have applied to both international and domestic broadcasts. It
offered guidelines for permissible broadcast materials and affirmed that
direct broadcasting should be carried out:
for the purposes of enhancing the educational level of the population,
developing culture and expanding international exchanges in the fields
of science, culture, and sport. The transmission of advertising and
other commercial material may be carried out only on the basis of spe-
cific agreements specially concluded between the states concerned. 129
The 1974 Soviet Draft Convention went on to prohibit:
any material which is detrimental to the maintenance of international
peace and security, which publicizes ideas of war, militarism, national
and racial hatred and enmity between peoples, which is aimed at inter-
fering in the internal domestic affairs of other States, or which under-
mines the foundations of the local civilizations, culture, way of life,
traditions or language. 30
The Draft would have limited the right to broadcast commercial material
in the absence of prior agreements. This language, combined with the
fact that the 1974 Soviet Draft Convention could be construed as apply-
ing to domestic as well as international broadcasts,13 ' posed serious
problems of vagueness and overbreadth, leaving little protection for
rights of free communication. The United States and other countries with
a tradition of protecting certain forms of communication could not agree
to such international controls without raising serious constitutional
issues. 13
2
The working draft contained in the COPUOS legal subcommittee
report of its eighteenth session in 1980,133 indicated that no agreement on
content guidelines had yet been reached. Furthermore, the report of the
127. 26 U.N.Y.B. 45 (1972).
128. See 1974 Soviet Draft Convention, supra note 31.
129. Id. art. III.
130. Id. art. IV.
131. The language of the 1974 Soviet Draft Convention was not limited to international
broadcasts, and could be construed as applying as well to domestic DBS programs.
132. See generally M. PRICE, supra note 98.
133. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/240, Annex II, appendix A (1980).
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Chairman of the legal subcommittee noted that the subcommittee had
been unable to agree on the need for such guidelines.' 34 The inability of
the international community to formulate a coherent set of content
guidelines is not surprising. Given the pluralistic nature of the world
community, it seems impossible for it to agree on content prohibitions a
priori which are narrow enough not to violate the free speech principles
of certain Western democracies and yet sufficiently broad to satisfy the
Soviet bloc and LDCs.
It has been difficult to reach an agreement even on the broad princi-
ple of restricting government sponsored political propaganda broad-
casts, 3 5 even though there is ample precedent for such a restriction. 136
As early as 1947, the General Assembly condemned "all forms of propa-
ganda in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or
likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression .... ,3 The real issue is how to define propa-
ganda without having a chilling effect on free expression.
In summary, there is no consensus on content guidelines, and no
substantive progress appears likely in the face of staunch opposition from
Western governments. Yet, the pressure from the LDCs for content reg-
ulations continues to grow. If Western governments hope to negotiate an
efficient broadcasting regime which protects their nationals' investments
in space, they must find some way to satisfy the legitimate concerns of
other countries for controls on program content.
3. Prior Consent
One alternative to restrictions on program content is to require
broadcasters to obtain the prior consent of affected countries before
broadcasting. On the one hand, a prior consent requirement has advan-
tages over an inflexible international code for program content. It would
encourage governments to coordinate programming and avoid offensive
134. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/271, Annex I, at 5 (1980).
135. Von Glahn, The Case for Legal Control of 'Liberation'Propaganda, 31 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 553, 584 (1966).
136. Is propaganda harmful for the international system? Is a prohibition on propaganda
desirable? At least one commentator suggests that there is no proven causal link between
propaganda and violence, and verbal assaults may release tension, lessening the pressure to
resort to violence. See Thomas, Approaches to Controlling Propaganda and Spillover from Di-
rect Broadcast Satellites, 5 STAN. J. OF INT'L STUD. 167, 197 (1970). A distinction may be
drawn for purposes of analysis between coercive and persuasive propaganda. Propaganda
which is merely persuasive may lead to positive change and open debate. See B. MURTY,
PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 9, 28-29, 87 (1968).
137. G.A. Res. 110, U.N. Doc. A/Res/l10 (1947).
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broadcasts which may heighten tensions. Even in the absence of a prior
consent requirement, broadcasters are likely to seek the consent of the
receiving government to avoid legal problems and assure their ability to
reach foreign audiences. On the other hand, a prior consent requirement
arguably invites government censorship and chills free expression. It
also may prove impossible to administer if governments insist on censor-
ing programs. Three specific prior consent proposals are considered:
Radio Regulation 428A, 138 the UNESCO Declaration on the Use of Sat-
ellite Broadcasting,139 and the General Assembly Resolution on Princi-
ples Governing DBS. 14
a. Radio Regulation 428A
Radio Regulation 428A 14 1 requires the minimization of radio trans-
missions over foreign countries through technical design, unless those
countries have consented to the broadcasts. The regulation addresses the
problem of "devising the characteristics of a space station in the Broad-
casting Satellite Service." '142 It applies to the initial stage of planning
direct broadcasts, but it is unclear whether foreign governments have ad-
ditional rights to object once broadcasting has begun. Arguably, Regula-
tion 428A is only a technical directive and does not establish a rule
requiring the ongoing consent or participation of the receiving country.
As a practical matter, however, if broadcasters are required by Regula-
tion 428A to obtain the initial consent of the receiving country, the re-
ceiving country may attach conditions to its consent, conditions which
may include participation in programming.
The language of Regulation 428A is ambiguous and poses several
questions. It requires that "all technical means available shall be
used" '14 3 to reduce radiation over foreign countries, but it does not ex-
plain what is meant by "available." Are technical means "available" if
they are known but not developed, developed but not generally used, or
generally used but not affordable to the particular broadcaster? Further-
more, broadcasters are required to reduce radiation "to the maximum
extent practicable,"'" but standards of practicality for a technologically
advanced country may not be appropriate for LDCs. Which countries
138. See supra note 43.
139. See supra note 52.
140. See supra note 28.
141. See supra notes 43, 107-112 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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have standing to insist that broadcasters obtain prior consent? If broad-
casts are beamed across a country that lacks the capacity to receive the
broadcasts, is that country really affected? If that country has its own
DBS system, and these broadcasts do not create "harmful interference,"
should that country have a right to prevent broadcasts to another con-
senting country? It is unclear what kind of "agreement" must be reached
with the affected country. Even if an agreement is not reached, there is
no mechanism for determining when the regulation has been breached
and no apparent sanction against the broadcaster.
b. The UNESCO Declaration on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting
The UNESCO Declaration on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting 145
was adopted in Paris in May, 1972, at the Seventeenth General Confer-
ence of UNESCO. It was adopted by a vote of 55 to seven, with 22
abstentions, over the objections of many Western governments, including
the United States.146 The Declaration declares that "it is necessary that
States, taking into account the principle of freedom of information, reach
or promote prior agreements concerning direct satellite broadcasting to
the population of countries other than the country of origin of the
transmission." 47
The UNESCO Declaration sets forth general nonbinding principles
as the basis for future negotiations. The requirements of prior consent
contained in the Declaration are ambiguous in four respects. First, the
Declaration does not specify which countries have the right to insist
upon prior consultation. For example, must broadcasters consult with
(1) those countries that are intended to receive broadcasts, (2) all coun-
tries receiving broadcasts, whether or not intended, or (3) all countries
that raise objections to broadcast material, whether or not they receive
any transmissions? Second, the text does not specify at what stage con-
sultations must occur. It refers to "prior agreements" but fails to explain
whether this means agreements prior to broadcasting or agreements prior
to programming.148 The Declaration does not indicate whether countries
can insist on further consultations once they have given their consent to
an initial agreement or whether their consent should be given on a pro-
gram-by-program basis. Nor does it explain the broadcaster's rights to
broadcast if an agreement is not reached. Third, it merely obligates the
sending country to "reach or promote" agreements but does not seem to
145. See supra note 52.
146. Id.
147. Id. art. IX.
148. Id.
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bind the broadcaster or prohibit broadcasts without prior consent.149
Fourth, paragraph two of the same provision states that "[w]ith respect
to commercial advertising, its transmission shall be subject to specific
agreement between the originating and receiving countries."15 This may
imply that noncommercial material is not subject to specific agreement.
Other provisions of the UNESCO Declaration may be read to ne-
gate a presumption that prior consent is required. The UNESCO Decla-
ration provides that the objective of a free flow of information is "to
ensure the widest possible dissemination ... of all news of all countries
.. " and requires "that every effort be made to ensure the factual accu-
racy of the information reaching the public." '151 The provision makes no
mention of a receiving country's right to determine the content of news
and information, although this right is asserted elsewhere in the
UNESCO Declaration with regard to educational programming. 152 The
omission of a right to control content in this provision implies that coun-
tries do not have this right at all. The Declaration further refers to cul-
tural programming and states that its objective is "to foster greater
contact and mutual understanding between peoples."' 53 Again, no right
of content control is asserted; the Declaration states only that such pro-
grams "should respect the distinctive character, the value and the dignity
of each, and the right of all countries and peoples to preserve their cul-
tures as a part of the common heritage of mankind."' 54 It appears that
the UNESCO Declaration, while affirming a right of prior consent
(which may be required in any case by the I.T.U. WARC Regulation
428A),' 55 neither provides specific guidelines as to forbidden material nor
grants receiving countries the right to participate in all programming
decisions.
c. The General Assembly Resolution
The General Assembly Resolution on Principles Governing DBS' 56
was adopted by a vote of 107 to thirteen, with thirteen abstentions, over
'the objections of the United States and most of Western Europe, as a
preparatory step toward the drafting and adoption of an international
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. art. V.
152. Id. art. VI.
153. Id. art. VII.
154. Id.
155. See 1971 WARC Radio Regulations, supra notes 43, 111, and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 28.
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convention governing the use of DBS.157 The resolution provides that
"[a] State which intends to establish or authorize the establishment of an
international direct television broadcasting satellite service shall without
delay notify the proposed receiving State or States of such intention and
shall promptly enter into consultation with any of those States which so
requests."15 It further provides that:
[a]ny broadcasting or receiving State within an international direct tel-
evision broadcasting satellite service established between them re-
quested to do so by any other broadcasting or receiving state within
the same service should promptly enter into consultations with the re-
questing State regarding its activities in the field of international direct
television broadcasting by satellite, without prejudice as to other con-
sultations which these states may undertake with any other State on
that subject. 159
In addition, the resolution states that an international DBS service shall
be established only after these conditions are met and on the basis of
agreements that conform to the relevant requirements of the I.T.U.160
The latter requirement of prior consultations is more broadly
worded than either Radio Regulation 428A or the UNESCO Declara-
tion. The General Assembly Resolution on Principles Governing DBS
would not require "prior consent" per se, but a country directing broad-
casts at a foreign country must give notice. This would not cover unin-
tended spillovers into the territory of another country because the
resolution provides that the relevant instruments of the I.T.U. (for exam-
ple, Radio Regulation 428A) shall be "exclusively applicable" to such
spillover.'61 Once notice is given, the broadcasting country "shall
promptly enter into consultation," if the affected country so requests. 162
There is no requirement that the affected country give its consent, nor is
there a provision that it bargain in good faith. The resolution provides
no direction on how consultations should proceed. The provision requir-
ing consultations with any broadcasting or receiving country requesting
consultations regarding "activities in the field of international direct tele-
vision broadcasting by satellite" is so broad that virtually any affected
157. The resolution represented years of negotiation in the COPUOS. Because there was
no consensus in the COPUOS, however, the resolution was not presented to the General As-
sembly as the COPUOS's final work product. Instead, the Soviet Union proposed it in the
form of a draft resolution.
158. See supra note 28, Annex, para. 13.
159. Id. para. 13.
160. Id. para. 10.
161. Id. para. 14.
162. Id. para. 15.
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country could request consultations at any time on any aspect of DBS; it
is unclear whose consent the broadcasters must obtain. This leaves the
process open to abuse by countries seeking to harass broadcasters. Thus,
the resolution has the potential for making broadcasting unmanageable
and for chilling free expression without adequately responding to the le-
gitimate concern of governments. While a General Assembly resolution
has no binding effect, it may serve as the basis for negotiating a conven-
tion on DBS broadcasting.
It may be argued that countries may not legally direct broadcasts to
another country without the consent of the receiving country, even in the
absence of an international agreement. 163 Alternatively, it is also argua-
ble that directing DBS signals to a foreign country without its consent
constitutes "harmful interference" with the telecommunication of the re-
ceiving country and is therefore prohibited by the I.T.C.1 4 Alterna-
tively, it may be argued that, except for the technical restrictions on
broadcasting imposed by Radio Regulation 428A and the prohibition on
"harmful interference" contained in the I.T.C., there is no principle of
international law that prohibits international DBS broadcasts.
4. Procedural Rules for Cooperative Participation
Another strategy for controlling broadcast content is the formula-
tion of procedural rules aimed at establishing cooperative international
broadcast programs. Procedural rules have a significant advantage over
broad content guidelines because they permit the parties to a dispute to
determine content regulation on an ad hoc basis. This avoids the usual
problems of vagueness and overbreadth associated with general guide-
lines. For this reason, it may also be easier to build international consen-
sus around content-neutral procedural rules than around content-based
guidelines. Procedural rules for cooperative broadcasting enterprises en-
courage broadcasting and receiving countries to consult continuously
and to develop programs that satisfy mutual needs.
In response to censorship concerns raised by content guidelines, the
Canadians and Swedes offered a new approach to content regulation in
their 1973 Canadian-Swedish Draft Proposal. 6 ' While the Canadians
and Swedes insisted upon prior consent before directing broadcasts to a
foreign country, they set no a priori limits on broadcast content. The
Canadian-Swedish Draft Proposal required that:
163. See, e.g., U.N. Doe. A/AC.105/127, at 13-16 (1974).
164. See I.T.C. supra note 22, art. 35(l).
165. U.N. Doe. A/AC.105/117, Annex IV (1973).
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States or their authorized broadcasting entities participating in direct
television broadcasting by satellite between States shall cooperate with
each other with regard to the scheduling, content, production and ex-
change of programmes and all other aspects, including if appropriate,
the training of technical and program personnel. The terms of such
cooperation shall be governed by appropriate international arrange-
ments between participating States or their authorized entities.'
66
This Draft was aimed at establishing regional broadcasting systems in
which countries would participate at every stage of production and
broadcasting. The Canadian-Swedish Draft Proposal avoided the need
for any universal content guidelines. The primary weakness of the Pro-
posal was that it would make virtually every aspect of international
broadcasting subject to government approval on an ad hoc basis. As a
result, direct broadcasting programs could become irregular and
uneconomical.1 67
In 1974, the United States offered a draft, 168 setting forth eleven
general principles, emphasizing the positive contribution of DBS technol-
ogy. The proposal provided that "[s]tates should seek to resolve any dis-
agreements which may arise concerning the carrying out of international
direct television broadcasting by satellite through consultation and, as
may be necessary, through established procedures for the settlement of
disputes."' 169
In 1979, the United States submitted a new working paper170 (1979
United States Draft Proposal) to the COPUOS Working Group which
would require consultations without necessarily requiring prior consent.
Under the 1979 United States Draft Proposal:
A State which proposes to establish or authorize the establishment of
an international direct television broadcasting service by means of arti-
ficial earth satellites specifically aimed at a foreign State should, with-
out delay, notify that State of such intention and should promptly
enter into consultations with that State if the latter so requests. The
State which proposes to establish or authorize such a service should
take into account and give due regard to the proposed service, as set
forth in such consultations. Any such consultations should also be
premised upon facilitating a free flow and a wider dissemination of
166. Id. art. VIII.
167. See A. CHAYES AND P. LASKIN, DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITES 30-31
(1975).
168. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/127, Annex IV (1974).
169. Id. art. X.
170. Elaboration of Draft Principles Governing the Use by States ofArtificial Earth Satellites
for Direct Television Broadcasting, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/C. 118 (1979).
19861
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
information of all kinds and encouraging co-operation in the field of
information and the exchange of information with other countries. 1
71
The cooperative participation approach to DBS programming was
further refined in the Argentine Draft Proposal.1 72 The Argentine Draft
Proposal, like the Canadian-Swedish Draft Proposal and the 1979 United
States Draft Proposal, eschewed content guidelines and affirmed that any
country has the right "to participate in activities which involve broad-
casts whose scope encompasses territories under its jurisdiction" and is
entitled outright "to determine the content of the educational program-
mes broadcast to their populations."' 173 The Argentine Draft, however,
would grant rights of redress to aggrieved countries rather than permit
affected countries to prevent certain DBS broadcasts. It would protect
the free flow of information and would affirm that "the right of reply
forms a complement to freedom of information" by assuring the accu-
racy of information imparted to the public. 174 Thus, a country that felt
itself unfairly criticized would have the right to reply to the broadcast.
The Draft does not specify whether private persons would possess the
same right to redress defamation or whether they would have to rely on
their governments to bring claims on their behalf. The Argentine Draft
further provides that all disputes would be resolved through procedures
established by convention or judicial arbitration. 175 It also suggests an
alternative approach to the strict requirement of prior consent or pro-
gram participation proposed by the Canadian-Swedish Draft Proposal
and the 1979 United States Draft Proposal. If countries have a right of
reply and redress, they may be less likely to insist on the right to review
specific program material prior to broadcast.
Other commentators have suggested that one or more international
commissions could be formed to define "harmful effects," set limits on
the kind of material a country may censor, license broadcasting and re-
solve disputes. 176 In addition, an international body could monitor inter-
national broadcasts to evaluate "harmful effects," receive complaints,
and facilitate negotiations between broadcasting and receiving countries.
It has been suggested that, over time, international dispute resolution
would yield a common law of international principles that would clarify
171. Id.
172. Draft International Convention on Direct Broadcasting by Satellite, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/134 (1974).
173. Id. arts. 10, 11.
174. Id. art. 13.
175. Id. art. 25.
176. A. SMITH, supra note 62, at 188; M. PRICE, supra note 98, at 84.
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broadcasters' liability and the receiving countries' responsibilities. 177
The paradigm of an adversarial procedure before an impartial third party
empowered to make a binding settlement may not fit the highly political
context of broadcasting disputes, however. Complaints about program
content or frequency usage are often motivated by political interests and
colored by deep-seated perceptions of national culture. Judicial reason-
ing is of limited utility when arbitrators face these kinds of political ques-
tions. Moreover, sovereign countries may not agree to be bound by the
decisions of an international tribunal that would override national re-
strictions on broadcasting.
5. Observations as to Substantive Strategies
Four substantive strategies have been considered: technical restric-
tions, content guidelines, prior consent, and procedural rules for cooper-
ative participation. Technical restrictions have been promulgated by the
I.T.U. and can limit the problem of spillover. Agreement on content-
neutral technical restrictions has been relatively easy to achieve, but the
applicability of the prior consent provisions of WARC Regulation 428A
is uncertain. Furthermore, these restrictions have not allayed concerns
about the content of broadcasting.
It appears highly unlikely that Western countries would consent to
content guidelines which may involve prior restraints on broadcasting.
Other Western countries and some LDCs share the concern of the
United States over censorship and recognize the difficulty of defining cat-
egories narrowly.1 78 Yet, pressure continues to grow for measures aimed
at protecting political and cultural life from alien values. If the United
States wants to safeguard its investment in space and open new markets
for its communications giants, it must acknowledge the legitimate con-
cerns over content and develop constructive responses, such as "coopera-
tive participation" and the sharing of access to DBS technology.
Even if the United States does not accept the various prior consent
schemes proposed by UNESCO, Canada, Sweden, and Argentina, it is
still bound to minimize spillover by the prior consent requirement of
WARC Regulation 428A. Broadcasters may resist government efforts to
censor material on a program-by-program basis, but they are unlikely to
risk their substantial investments by broadcasting without some prior
consultations with the receiving countries. Such agreements will perhaps
177. Id.
178. In fact, LDCs exploit Western fears of censorship when they bargain for access to
satellite broadcasting technology.
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have to be negotiated on a country-by-country basis, however, the UN or
the I.T.U. could facilitate such agreements by developing flexible proce-
dures for dispute resolution if parties are unable to reach agreements
through prior consultation.
Regulatory strategies alone will not lead to a two-way flow of news
and information. Until the LDCs have a share in world communica-
tions, they have no stake in defending a system of unrestricted communi-
cations nor are they likely to identify with the asserted right to receive
and impart news and information across national borders. The chal-
lenge, then, for the proponents of the free flow critique is to make direct
broadcasting accessible to LDCs. This requires both technical assistance
and the allocation of orbital space and radio frequencies.
C. International Access Strategies: Allocation of Resources
1. Introduction
DBS raises distributional issues of two types: allocation of space
and allocation of radio frequencies. These issues are interrelated and
closely linked to the state of technology. Therefore, as direct broadcast
technology matures, these questions may be redefined or eliminated.
Questions regarding space allocation arise in relation to two primary re-
sources employed in direct broadcast technology: orbital space and the
radio spectrum. Both resources are technologically defined in that the
extent of available orbital space and radio frequencies are determined
primarily by technology. The GSO can accommodate more satellites as
the technology of positioning satellites and channeling their radio waves
improves.
2. National Claims to Portions of the GSO
Specific proposals for allocation must be considered in light of cer-
tain national claims to portions of the GSO. In particular, some equato-
rial countries have claimed sovereign control over a portion of the GSO.
In November 1976, seven equatorial countries issued the Bogota Decla-
ration,1 7 9 claiming a right of permanent sovereignty over the portion of
the GSO directly above their territories."' 0 The Bogota Declaration em-
179. Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire. Brazil sent an
observer who also signed the Declaration, though Brazil has not officially acceded to it. The
Bogata Declaration, I.T.U., Broadcasting Satellite Conference, Doc. No. 81-E (Jan. 17, 1977),
Annex 4, reprinted in Current Documents, The Bogota Declaration, 6 J. SPACE L. 193-96
(1978) [hereinafter Bogata Declaration].
180. The equatorial states argued that the Outer Space Treaty is inapplicable because it
leaves open the definition of outer space for auto-interpretation; the GSO, by their interpreta-
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bodies five principles. First, it defines the GSO as a natural resource
derived from the earth's gravitational pull and an "integral part of the
territory over which the equatorial [countries] exercise their national sov-
ereignty."18 Second, those segments of the GSO which correspond to
the high seas are the "common heritage of mankind." '82 Third, the
equatorial countries will permit other countries' satellites to pass above
their territories only if outside the GSO. 1'83 Fourth, satellites cannot
enter the GSO over an equatorial country without the prior and express
permission of that country and are subject to the national laws of that
country.18 4 Fifth, prior use of a portion of the GSO by a foreign country
does not create any prior right to the use of the orbit. 85
The claims of the equatorial countries distort law and logic. It is
illogical to claim that the GSO is produced solely by the gravitational
force of the underlying territories; rather, it is the whole of the earth's
mass that produces the gravitational pull.'8 6 Moreover, the earth's grav-
ity is only one factor contributing to the orbit of the GSO; the relation-
ship of the sun and moon, the effects of solar radiation, and the forward
propulsion of the satellite are all contributing factors." 7 If the equatorial
countries' argument were accepted, virtually any country could claim the
space above its territory which satellites traverse. The resulting break-
down in international order is precisely what the Outer Space Treaty was
intended to avoid. Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty provides that
"Outer Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not sub-
ject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation or by any other means."1 ' This would preclude the national
claims of the equatorial countries. The equatorial countries, however,
reply that the GSO is not "outer space." Although the term "outer
tion, is excluded. They asserted that the GSO is linked to their terrestrial territories by the
earth's gravitation and is an aspect of their "full and permanent sovereignty" over their natural
resources. These countries argue that the Bogota Declaration is consistent with G.A. Resolu-
tion 3281 (XXIX), art. 2(1), which affirms that "Every [country] has and shall freely exercise
permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural re-
sources, and economic activities." Id. at 194. See also Statement by Mr. Gaviria, Representa-
tive of Colombia, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.184, at 15-26 (1978).
181. See Bogata Declaration, supra note 179.
182. Id. § 3, para. 6.
183. Id. para. c.
184. Id. para. d.
185. Id. para. e. See generally Statement by Mr. Albornoz, Representative of Ecuador, U.N.
A/AC.105/PV.197 (1980). See also Statement by Mr. Kangwana, Representative of Kenya,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.184, at 67-75 (1978), defending the Bogota Declaration.
186. Gorbiel, The Legal Status of the Geostationary Orbit, 6 J. SPACE L. 171, 176 (1978).
187. Id. at 176.
188. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 26 art. 2.
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space" has never been defined, it previously has not been doubted that
the limits of outer space included points 22,300 miles over the equator. 89
In fact, the Bogota Declaration has not been widely accepted and
has been repudiated by all the space powers as well as other developed
countries, including the Soviet bloc countries.' 90 The Bogota Declara-
tion is neither a binding international convention nor evidence of a cus-
tomary practice accepted as law.
3. International Allocation of the GSO
The WARCs have taken three important steps toward allocating the
radio frequency spectrum and GSO.' 91 First, the 1971 WARC declared
that all countries have "equal rights" to use the GSO and the radio fre-
quencies allocated to space radiocommunication services. 192 The same
WARC established a procedure to coordinate allocation of the GSO. 1 9 3
This procedure requires any country planning to establish a satellite ser-
vice to provide certain specified information to the IFRB. If the pro-
posed plan conflicts with broadcasting by a prior user, the country is
obliged to coordinate plans with the prior user. Although this procedure
does not provide rules for conflict resolution, its effect is to encourage
increased information exchange and mutual effort towards accommoda-
tion. Third, the WARC in 1977 agreed to a voluntary plan for regional
allocation of the GSO 1 94 The nonbinding plan divided the GSO into
alternating segments which were committed for primary use by broad-
cast satellites and other fixed satellites. Europe, Africa and Central Asia
(region one), the Americas (region two), and South and East Asia (region
189. See Gorbiel, supra note 186; Wiessner, supra note 8, at 245-48; Jakhu, The Legal
Status of the Geostationary Orbit, 7 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 334 (1982).
190. The Bogota Declaration has been acknowledged only by Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela,
Spain, and Mexico, according to Mr. Albornoz, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.213, at 12 (1980).
Predictably, none of the space powers or Western industrialized countries have accepted the
Bogota Declaration as law. Several Soviet bloc countries have taken the lead in condemning
the Declaration. See, e.g., Statement by the Representative of the German Democratic Repub-
lic, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.213, at 31 (1980). The Soviet Union has proposed clarification
of the GSO status in the DBS working draft by affirming the "customary delimitation" of
outer space at the height of 100 kilometers.
For a discussion of scientific arguments refuting the Bogota Declaration, see Perek, Scien-
tific Criteria for the Delimitation of Outer Space, 5 J. SPACE L. 111 (1977).
191. Gorove, The Geostationary Orbit, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 459-61 (1979). Mr.
Gorove's article includes a very useful discussion of the applicable resolutions of the WARC in
greater depth than discussed herein.
192. 1971 WARC Radio Regulations, supra note 43, No. Spa2-1.
193. Id. Annex 8, art. 9a.
194. Final Acts of the WARC for the Planning of the Broadcast Satellite Service in Fre-
quency Bands 11. 7-12.2 GHz and 1L 7-12.5 GHz, I.T.U. Final Protocol No. 51, art. 5 (1977).
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three) agreed to assign specific orbital positions and radio frequencies to
each country. Each country has a prior right to use its allotted positions
and frequencies. If a country does not exercise its prior right to allotted
positions or frequencies, then all other countries have an equal right to
use them without restrictions imposed by the country with prior
rights.195
At this time, the future of the WARC regional plan of frequency and
GSO allocation are uncertain. The United States has stated that it will
not be bound by the regional plan for GSO allocation and has called for
an unregulated regime that would "evolve" appropriate mechanisms for
coordination. 196 It remains unclear whether other countries will accede
to the plan's voluntary limitations. The most that can be said for the
present status of the WARC regional plan is that it is a voluntary plan
which applies to most of the world's countries.
4. Prior Rights Model and WARC Plan Compared
The 1977 WARC plan to allocate orbital positions and frequencies
may be contrasted with a scheme where a prior user of orbital space and
frequencies has a prior right against all others. This alternative model
might be called a "prior rights model." The weakness of the 1977
WARC plan is that it might not be flexible enough to allow for technical
developments that might alter the supply of and demand for orbital space
and frequencies. On the other hand, the prior rights model would not
redress the economic and technical disparities that prevent the majority
of countries from utilizing DBS. In fact, neither plan provides a mecha-
nism for technological transfer. Without this, the GSO remains inacces-
sible to most LDCs. Each of these issues - future supply of and demand
for the GSO and frequencies, and technological barriers to entry - will
be addressed below.
The WARC's regional allocation plan assumes that the supply of
orbital space and frequencies is limited and that this circumstance will
continue for some time. In fact, these assumptions may be incorrect.
There is good reason to believe that technical innovation will continue to
195. Id. art. 7(11).
196. See Views of Member States on Geostationary Orbit, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/252/
Add.1, at 4-13 (1979), in which the United States Representative argues that the advance of
technology will expand the GSO; see also Views of Member States on Space Transport Systems,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/262, at 12 (1979), which defends the feasibility of space platforms for
direct broadcasting. For a general discussion of the U.S. position as of 1985 concerning the
WARC regional plan for allocating the GSO and radio frequency spectrum, see Humphlett,
Use of the Geostationary Orbit and U.S. Participation in the 1985 World Administrative Radio
Conference, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, May 1, 1985, at 60-75.
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expand the GSO and radio spectrum to meet increasing demand. 197
Moreover, there is no immediate threat of exhausting available radio fre-
quencies for broadcast satellites, nor is there currently a scarcity of GSO
positions. 198 Even assuming, however, an orbital space and radio spec-
trum adequate to accommodate current and projected demand, an allo-
cation plan may still be required. If prior users can establish prior rights
to as much orbital space as they can occupy, prior users have an incen-
tive to place satellites in the GSO without regard to efficient use or spac-
ing. It costs nothing to occupy orbital space and radio frequencies
(except for the expense of launching and operating the satellite). As
prior users race to occupy more orbital space and radio frequencies, the
available supply will be exhausted so that prior rights will become quite
valuable. Under a prior rights model, prior users reap a windfall by ex-
ploiting orbital space and radio spectrum without regard to efficiency.
Just as a rigid allocation plan that reserves space for LDCs without re-
gard to user demand may be inefficient, a prior rights model may reward
wastefulness. On the other hand, an allocation plan that maximizes effi-
ciency may be politically impossible if it fails to satisfy the demands of a
majority of the world's nations for a fair share of the technical resources.
What is needed, then, is a plan that serves both efficiency and equity.
5. Barriers to Entry
Any allocation scheme must address the problem of barriers to en-
try. Economic and institutional factors prevent equal access by the
LDCs. First, economic barriers make DBS systems inaccessible to most
countries. Few LDCs can afford to plan, build, launch, and maintain
such systems. Even those countries which do develop DBS systems must
be willing to modify their systems continually if they want to remain
197. See SCIENCE, supra note 47, at 1044.
198. The GSO is capable of accommodating a finite number of satellites greater than 180.
It is impossible, however, to calculate the maximum number of satellites because of constant
technological developments. As of 1982, there were approximately 169 satellites stationed in
the GSO, at least 61 of which were no longer functional and could be removed from orbit.
Physical Nature and Technical Attributes of the Geostationary Orbit, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/
203/Add.4, at 3-5 (1983). More sophisticated technology would permit satellites to be placed
closer together, increasing the number of positions available in the future. By the end of this
decade, scientists expect to be able to construct large platforms in space, each capable of per-
forming the function of many different satellites. These space platforms would have huge
power resources which would greatly reduce the demand for additional space in the GSO.
Although it is difficult to predict future demand for satellites, the current pace of technological
development indicates that the GSO will probably be capable of absorbing existing demand
through 1990. At that time, space platforms could be ready for deployment. See SCIENCE,
supra note 47; Humphlett, supra note 196, at 22-26.
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competitive, and must modify or replace existing satellites to avoid inter-
ference with other countries' transmissions. Unless countries have an in-
centive to use more efficient technology, frequency and orbital space will
be wasted, leaving fewer resources for other countries. Thus, cost is both
a barrier to entry and a barrier to increased efficiency. Inefficiency harms
both the rich and poor countries.
Second, institutional constraints also limit many countries' access to
a DBS system. There is no enforcement agency that can effectively as-
sure the availability of adequate orbital space and radio frequencies for
LDCs entering direct broadcasting subsequent to the industrialized
countries. In effect, the present system is one of prescriptive rights in
which prior users cannot be displaced.
Economic and institutional constraints suggest that a system that
allocates frequencies and orbital space on a first-come, first-served basis
perpetuates economic disparities between rich and poor countries and
results in an inefficient use of resources.
6. Two Alternative Allocation Models
What is needed is a system that protects the LDCs' rights to use the
GSO in the future and provides them with some leverage so they can
bargain with developed countries for access to the technology. This sys-
tem must be flexible enough to permit countries to adapt to changing
needs and capacities. This system might also serve as a model for tech-
nology transfers from space powers to poor countries in related technolo-
gies, such as earth-sensing and meteorological satellites. Two alternative
models for structuring an international allocation of orbital positions and
radio frequencies are: the licensing model and the transferable rights
model. 199 A licensing model would involve an international agency with
authority to issue renewable licenses for resource use. A transferable
rights model would involve the creation of "permanent" rights which
would be transferable.
A licensing model might appear more equitable and rational. The
licensing agency could assure that resources were fairly distributed and
could prevent wealthier, technologically advanced countries from mono-
polizing the resources. Given the relative scarcity of orbital space and
frequency, a licensing model would also ensure a diversity of news and
information by guaranteeing to all countries equal access to the re-
199. For a general discussion comparing the licensing and transferable rights models in the
context of allocating radio spectrum, see Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2
J. L. & ECON. 1 (1959).
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sources. As technology develops, shifting the supply of and demand for
the resources, the licensing agency could reallocate licenses accordingly.
There are three fundamental problems with a licensing model.
First, who would control the licensing authority? To the extent that per-
sons in authority can determine the distribution of valuable resources,
the political argument over how to distribute becomes an argument over
who will control the distribution. Second, because it is impractical to
move satellites once licenses expire, a system of renewable licenses is
likely to become a permanent allocation of resources. Thus, a licensing
model probably would not be sufficiently flexible to accommodate
changes in the market. Third, there is insufficient economic data to pro-
vide an objective basis upon which a politicized licensing agency could
determine the most efficient allocation of resources.
A transferable rights model would rely upon the pricing mechanism
for a more efficient allocation of the resources. It would avoid political
conflicts over who should allocate or how to allocate the resources.
Either an international agency could auction off rights to orbital spaces
and use the proceeds to benefit LDCs, or the resources could be distrib-
uted equally among countries who could then trade rights among them-
selves. In either case, the countries willing to pay the highest price for
the resources (which would not necessarily be the wealthiest countries)
would earn the right to use the resource. The other countries would ben-
efit by the transfer of wealth. As market conditions changed and new
parties sought to enter the market, countries could purchase both rights
and satellites from other countries. In contrast to the licensing model,
reallocation would not depend upon the political decisions of an interna-
tional agency faced with the impracticability of removing prior users
from the GSO. Instead, price would dictate access to both resources and
satellites, which would remain in orbit.
The principal objection to a transferable rights model is that the
GSO and radio spectrum are scarce resources, access to which implicates
basic rights to broadcast. A system that fails to guarantee equal access
would be both unfair and politically impractical. 200 Although the GSO
and radio spectrum are scarce resources, all valuable resources are
scarce. Scarcity in itself is not a justification for licensing rights to use a
resource. Moreover, the availability of these resources will not in itself
enable a country to broadcast. Countries that do not have the technical
and financial resources or the market for broadcasting will not use their
200. For a discussion of the LDCs' perspective on the allocation of the GSO, see generally
Wiessner, supra note 8, at 242-45.
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resource rights. These countries are better off if they can transfer their
rights. The transfer of resource rights could be in exchange for a cash
payment, access to technology, use of the satellite, or some combination
of these. Thus, rather than limiting access to rich countries, a transfera-
ble rights model could give LDCs leverage to gain access to these re-
sources and the necessary technology. Because the transferable rights
model represents a transfer of wealth and technology to the LDCs, it
could be a more politically attractive option than a licensing scheme.
The transferable rights model, however, presents a number of ques-
tions. Would it be preferable to allocate rights to orbital space and radio
frequencies directly to countries, or should their rights be auctioned by
an international agency? How would orbital space and radio frequencies
be allocated initially? They could be allocated to countries equally or
proportionally, based on criteria such as area, population, gross national
product, demand for broadcast satellites, or level of technical develop-
ment. As a practical matter, the space powers would be as reluctant to
give the majority of resources to the LDCs as the LDCs would be to
accept a distribution based entirely on gross national product or level of
technical development. One possible compromise would be to distribute
orbital positions in the GSO according to one set of criteria and to dis-
tribute radio frequencies according to other criteria.
Assuming agreement on a formula to divide space proportionally,
an additional problem is that each orbital position in the GSO or radio
frequency is not equally valuable. For example, GSO positions over
Western Europe would be more valuable than positions over countries
without a capacity to receive DBS. Moreover, allocation may be difficult
because the demand for spaces is not evenly distributed. For example,
relatively few countries in South America compete for a large number of
GSO positions over that continent, while many countries in Europe com-
pete for a narrow band of positions. It is therefore possible that some
countries could receive spaces from which they could not broadcast to
their home markets. These countries would have to arrange to share
their spaces with other countries.
The problems with direct allocation lead to the conclusion that it
would be more practical if broadcasters could purchase all presently
available orbital spaces and radio frequencies from one international
agency, such as the I.T.U. The I.T.U. would negotiate for the sale of
spaces and frequencies, and the income from these sales could be used to
provide technical and financial assistance to the LDCs. To be sure, many
practical problems would arise in determining how to allocate funds. A
competitive bidding process managed by an international agency, how-
19861
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ever, would ensure that resources were efficiently used. This process
would be acceptable to most countries that would benefit from a transfer
of wealth and technology.20
1
7. Observations
This discussion of GSO and radio spectrum allocation raises some
questions that must be addressed if the goals of efficiency, equitable ac-
cess, and order are to be achieved. To the extent these strategies achieve
these goals, it may be possible to replace the unidirectional flow of inter-
national news and information with a multidirectional flow. This is criti-
cal to developing an acceptable plan without undue restrictions on
freedom to broadcast. This discussion suggests that, by expanding access
to the resources, the international community can reach a consensus that
promotes rather than restricts international broadcasting and cultural
exchange.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article began by examining the statist and free flow critiques of
direct broadcasting. Both critiques represent idealized forms of argu-
ment, made by the representatives of states, structured from the perspec-
tive of states, for the purpose of advancing the interests of states. This
article has been concerned with making DBS safe for sovereignty and has
examined proposals for protecting sovereign interests (including national
security, culture, and pride) from the new technology. It is important to
recognize, however, that this approach is characteristic of a statist model
of jurisprudence. This model assumes that the state is the principal, if
not the sole, actor in the international community, and that the function
of international law is to protect and service the state's interests. The
problem of direct broadcasting could be recast in a culturalist model of
jurisprudence. Instead of adopting statist goals, the culturalist approach
would focus on the consequences of the new technology for states.
Rather than proposing rules to limit the forces of social change, it would
examine ways in which rules could facilitate change and evolve into prac-
tices accepted as law. Plainly, the state cannot be ignored. It, however,
can be seen as one actor in the context of many, all of whom are subject
to social change. This article has tried to address current issues and
problems in direct broadcasting from the perspective of a state's interests.
It, instead, might have adopted a culturalist approach and attempted to
201. For a discussion of problems arising out of allocating the GSO, see id. at 239-45.
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predict how broadcasting will alter a state's relations and redefine a
state's goals and even sovereignty.
Technology has become a powerful component in contemporary life
and social change. As the pace of technology quickens, our society is
overwhelmed by technology's irresistible force. Why presume that states
and sovereignty will remain unaffected? Once direct broadcasting opens
new routes for television programming, accelerating the transfer of infor-
mation and culture, international agreements or regulatory bodies will
find it difficult to stem the flow of social change. If direct broadcasting
offers opportunities for cultural exchange, as it surely will, we should
take a hard, critical look at the sovereign whose armies of censors guard
the national borders.

